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The Origins of American Design Patent Protection 
JASON J. DU MONT 
MARK D. JANIS* 
Many firms invest heavily in the way their products look, and they rely on a 
handful of intellectual property regimes to stop rivals from producing look-alikes. 
Two of these regimes—copyright and trademark—have been closely scrutinized in 
intellectual property scholarship. A third, the design patent, remains little 
understood except among specialists. In particular, there has been virtually no 
analysis of the design patent system’s core assumption: that the rules governing 
patents for inventions should be incorporated en masse for designs. 
One reason why the design patent system has remained largely unexplored in 
the literature is that scholars have never explained how and why the system came 
to exist. This Article seeks to provide that account. We show how technological 
innovation in early American manufacturing (especially in the cast-iron goods 
industry) created unprecedented opportunities for creativity in industrial design 
and a concomitant expansion in design piracy. We analyze manufacturers’ 
lobbying efforts that led to the first American legislative proposals for design 
protection, and we connect those proposals to antecedents in British copyright and 
design registration legislation. We also explain how these early proposals were 
transmuted into design patent proposals, and we explore the idiosyncratic political 
circumstances that surrounded the eventual passage of the design patent bill. We 
conclude by reassessing the modern design patent regime in view of insights drawn 
from our historical account. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the space of a few weeks in late 2011, automaker Daimler AG sued an Asian 
manufacturer for infringing patents on the diminutive “Smart Car”;1 Crocs, maker 
of the eponymous (and wildly popular) rubber-molded footwear, filed a patent 
infringement suit against Walgreens;2 Kohler sued a rival for infringing patents on 
stainless steel sinks;3 and Apple and Samsung continued their worldwide battle 
over smart phones and tablet computers.4 High-stakes, high-tech patent lawsuits 
such as these have become the norm on civil dockets of many federal courts across 
the country. What differentiates these suits is that they involve patents on designs—
that is, patents on a product’s visual appearance, not merely on the inventive 
components that make it work.5 There are many other recent examples, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Complaint for Trademark and Trade Dress Infringement, Trademark Counterfeiting, 
Patent Infringement, Unfair Competition and Trademark Dilution, Daimler AG v. 
Shuanghuan Auto. Co., No. 2:11-cv-13588-MOB-MAR (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2011). 
 2. Complaint for Patent Infringement, Crocs, Inc. v. Walgreen, Co., No. 1:11-cv-
02954-MSK (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2011). 
 3. Complaint, Kohler Co. v. Amerisink, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00921-WEC (E.D. Wis. Oct. 
3, 2011). 
 4. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 5. See, e.g., 1 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 1502 (8th ed. rev. 2010) 
(specifying that, in the context of design patents, design refers to “the visual characteristics 
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application-filing trends suggest that intellectual property litigation over designs 
will become increasingly common worldwide.6 
Design patent cases routinely deal with the products of technological innovation, 
but they also bring into confluence matters of consumer preference, aesthetics, and 
even art. For example, litigation between Apple and Samsung over the design of 
the iPad is as much about Steve Jobs’s and Jonathan Ive’s obsession with minute 
aspects of visual aesthetics as it is about touch-screen technology;7 and it involves a 
claim that devices depicted in Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 science fiction movie 2001: 
A Space Odyssey so resemble the iPad that Apple’s design protection should be 
declared invalid.8 
Herein lies the problem. Intellectual property law has a fetish with 
categorization; design, by contrast, is holistic, amorphous, and multivariate.9 It is 
little wonder that fitting intellectual property law to design has proven so difficult. 
After nearly two centuries of effort, there remain fundamental questions about how 
best to craft legislative schemes that will facilitate innovation in industrial design. 
The topic perennially appears on the U.S. legislative agenda, most recently in the 
form of proposals to create special protection for fashion designs.10 A wider-
ranging reexamination of design protection is underway in the United Kingdom.11 
The design protection debate is one of intellectual property law’s most intractable,12 
                                                                                                                 
embodied in or applied to an article”). 
 6. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS 153–80 (2011) (reporting statistics on industrial design protection). 
 7. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Steve Jobs: Designer First, C.E.O. Second, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
6, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/steve-jobs-designer-first-c-e-o-
second/. 
 8. Eriq Gardner, Is Apple’s iPad Copied From ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’?, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/is-apples-
ipad-copied-2001-227700 (providing a video clip from the movie scene at issue). 
 9. DISCOVERING DESIGN: EXPLORATIONS IN DESIGN STUDIES xiii, xvi (Richard 
Buchanan & Victor Margolin eds., 1995) (characterizing design as “the science of the 
artificial” and as “a new liberal art of industrial and technological culture”); ARTHUR J. 
PULOS, AMERICAN DESIGN ETHIC: A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN TO 1940, at vii (1983) 
(referring to design as “the indispensable leavening of the American way of life”); see also 
Alice Rawsthorn, What Defies Defining, but Exists Everywhere?; A Hint: It’s Two Parts 
Creation and One Part ‘Dastardly Plan,’ INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 18, 2008, at 8 (quoting 
a design historian for the proposition that “[d]esign is to produce a design to design a 
design.”). 
 10. Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. 
(2011); BRIAN T. YEH, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH CONGRESS (2010) (discussing, inter alia, S. 3728, a 
fashion design protection bill that passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2010). On 
earlier efforts, see David Goldenberg, The Long and Winding Road: A History of the Fight 
Over Industrial Design Protection in the United States, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 21 
(1997) (addressing proposals to enact new forms of design protection legislation in the 
twentieth century). 
 11. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, IPO ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR REFORM OF THE 
DESIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FRAMEWORK (2011). 
 12. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design 
Protection Law—A Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387, 387 (1993) 
(“[I]ndustrial design has posed the intellectual property world’s single most complicated 
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engrossing decades of legislative effort in the United States alone.13 This debate has 
become particularly heated and uncharacteristically mainstream following the 
massive verdict against Samsung,14 the size of which may have been largely driven 
by the presence of the design patents. 
In the United States, we have never settled on a satisfactory answer to a basic 
normative question: why should we use a patent system to protect industrial 
designs? One reason that this question has proven so confounding and persistent is 
that the antecedent historical question has not been adequately addressed: how (and 
why) did the United States decide to create a patent system for designs? In this 
Article, we answer this historical question. In doing so, we seek to provide a 
foundation for resolving the normative question. 
Our historical analysis of the intersection between intellectual property law and 
design complements recent scholarly debates about design protection, but we have 
different objectives and a different orientation. First, we do not confine our 
discussion to the fashion industry, the focal point of recent scholarship.15 We are 
more interested in examining how intellectual property regimes affect the industrial 
design enterprise in the vast majority of industries—literally everything, including 
the kitchen sink. Second, we orient our discussion around the design patent regime; 
our chief objective is to understand how that regime should operate as one 
paradigm among many others in contemporary design intellectual property. 
Scholars have written very little about the design patent system.16 
In Part I, we describe the existing U.S. design patent system and situate it within 
the legal landscape of intellectual property protection for designs. We focus on two 
chief points: (1) the design patent system’s traditionally plebeian status among U.S. 
intellectual property regimes, contributing to a persistent problem that we describe 
as design patent’s identity crisis; and (2) the thesis that the design patent system 
originated as a historical accident. 
In the remaining Parts, we offer a historical analysis of the design patent 
system’s origins, aimed at discerning the role and identity of the design patent 
system and at critically evaluating the claim that design patent is an accidental 
intellectual property regime. Part II shows how technological advances in 
                                                                                                                 
puzzle.”). 
 13. E.g., In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., 
concurring) (“Fabulous amounts of time and effort have been poured into solving the design 
protection problem with, to date, no legislative solution.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Leo Kelion, Apple Versus Samsung: Jury Foreman Justifies $1bn Verdict, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19425052. 
 15. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of 
Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009) (advocating a limited anti-copying right for fashion 
design); cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1776 (2006) (arguing that 
“fashion’s cyclical nature is furthered and accelerated by a regime of open appropriation” 
rather than a regime featuring stronger intellectual property protection). 
 16. Notable exceptions include Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design 
Patent Rights (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-17, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656590; Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: 
Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531 (2010); 
Janice M. Mueller & Daniel Harris Brean, Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of 
Nonobviousness in Design Patents, 99 KY. L.J. 419 (2010–2011). 
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antebellum American manufacturing created opportunities for manufacturers to 
incorporate design elements into mass-produced consumer goods and 
simultaneously triggered a design piracy problem. Part III chronicles the origin and 
evolution of legislative proposals that eventually matured into the design patent 
provisions, the first form of American intellectual property protection covering 
designs. We rely here on newly uncovered archival sources that reveal insights 
about the lobbying influence of prominent manufacturers, the political agendas of 
key intellectual property insiders, and connections with a legislative fight that 
degenerated into one of the most serious political crises in antebellum America, the 
fight over protectionist tariffs. We conclude in Part IV with some prescriptions for 
doctrinal change in modern design patent law, informed by our historical analysis. 
I. MODERN PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM 
The design patent system has led a long but quiet life. Many observers have 
regarded it with ambivalence or written it off as an intellectual property 
lightweight. From the limited commentary about the design patent system, two 
themes emerge. First, some view the design patent system as having never 
developed a distinctive identity, a raison d’être. Second, some dismiss the design 
patent system as the product of historical accident. We discuss both views below, 
arguing that these are two primary obstacles to the development of a more fully 
theorized design patent system. 
A. Design Patent’s Identity Crisis 
The design patent system is, first, a patent system. The U.S. design patent 
system is based primarily on three brief provisions that comprise Chapter 16 of the 
general (utility) patent statute.17 These provisions impose the condition that designs 
be “ornamental” in order to warrant protection,18 and they establish a fourteen-year 
term of protection (measured from the date of grant),19 rules that are unique to 
design patents. In most other respects, however, the modern design patent system 
relies on substantive rules that were developed for patents on inventions—utility 
patent rules. Indeed, perhaps the most important design patent provision is Section 
171’s seemingly mundane incorporation clause, incorporating by reference “[t]he 
provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions . . . .”20 That language, 
applied over the course of more than a century and a half of utility patent law 
evolution, has the effect of subjecting design patents to modern patent validity 
conditions such as the requirement for nonobviousness21 and to the modern judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171–73 (2006). A special remedies provision for design patent 
infringement is codified separately. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 173; see also Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-211, § 102, 126 Stat. 1527, 1532 (providing for a fifteen-year term). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 171; see Du Mont, supra note 16, at 578–82 (tracing the development 
and expansion of the incorporation clause from its inception in the 1842 Act to its modern 
incarnation). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
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framework for deciding questions of utility patent infringement.22 It also guarantees 
that the complex provisions of the America Invents Act of 2011 apply to design 
patents, even though the policy basis for that legislation emanated entirely from 
debates over utility patent protection.23 
Beyond its incorporation of substantive patent law rules, the design patent 
system is also very much a patent system from an institutional perspective. Like 
their utility patent counterparts, design patent applications are subject to 
substantive, pre-grant examination administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.24 Design patent infringement matters are subject to the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—again, like utility patents.25 
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the design patent right resembles the 
utility patent right in terms of sheer economic power. Even accounting for the 
recent design patent renaissance,26 design patents as a group have never achieved 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. That framework requires a construction of the patent’s claims, deemed to be a pure 
question of law, followed by a rigorous comparison of each element of the construed claim 
to the product accused of infringement. See, e.g., Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, 
Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 23. See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its 
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2012) (cataloguing the provisions of the 
America Invents Act without mentioning their impact on design patents). 
 24. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 5, at ch. 1500. 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (appeals from district courts in cases arising under 
the patent laws); id. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
with respect to rejected patent applications). 
 26. When the Federal Circuit reformulated the law of design patent infringement in 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), 
predictions of a renaissance in design patent enforcement quickly followed. See, e.g., James 
Juo, Egyptian Goddess: Rebooting Design Patents and Resurrecting Whitman Saddle, 18 
FED. CIR. B.J. 429, 450 (2009) (predicting that the Egyptian Goddess decision “should 
strengthen design patents, especially those that have been drafted with careful attention to 
the novel features to be protected”); Myshala E. Middleton, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 
Inc.: Design Patent Infringement Revolutionized by an Egyptian Goddess, 17 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 179, 185 (2009) (Egyptian Goddess will serve to “streamline future 
design patent infringement cases.”). In the time since Egyptian Goddess, the Federal Circuit 
has handed down important new design patent decisions at an unusual pace. See, e.g., 
Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (analyzing design patent 
functionality by assessing the functionality of individual design features rather than the 
design as a whole); Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(applying the Egyptian Goddess infringement standard and remarking on claim 
construction); Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (abandoning the point of novelty test as an element of the patentability analysis); Titan 
Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (debating, 
but not resolving, whether the standard for design patent obviousness should be modified in 
view of Supreme Court developments in the law of obviousness for utility patents). Filings 
for U.S. design patents have increased substantially, and this phenomenon is not confined to 
the United States. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 2012 WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY INDICATORS 9 (2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/
intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2012.pdf (noting that design applications grew strongly in 
2010–2011). 
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anything like the exclusionary power commonly attributed today to utility patents. 
In the late 1980s, courts had arguably narrowed design patents so substantially that 
Judge Rich remarked acerbically that “[d]esign patents have almost no scope.”27 
Indeed, Jerry Reichman has argued that during the course of the twentieth century, 
design patents had become trivial, functioning as little more than evidence of title 
and of priority for filing foreign design applications.28 Courts are likely to treat 
design patents more generously today—but, in a sense, this only adds to the 
ambivalence over the design patent’s stature. Is it, and should it be, a real patent? 
Notwithstanding the incorporation of the utility patent rules and institutional 
framework, is the design patent a mysterious intellectual property right that simply 
wears the patent moniker? A fuller historical analysis of the origin of the design 
patent system could provide a foundation for answering these questions. 
The emergence of copyright and trademark protection for designs has only 
further complicated the problem of carving out a role for the design patent. As we 
will discuss, when design patent protection was introduced in 1842, it was the sole 
form of American intellectual property protection for designs.29 That is no longer 
true. Under current U.S. law, designers may seek protection for many types of 
designs under the copyright30 and trademark31 regimes and may hold those forms of 
protection concurrently with design patent protection.32 In addition, vessel hull 
designers may secure a special form of design protection administered within the 
copyright system.33 
As these forms of intellectual property protection developed, the domain of 
design patents became increasingly more difficult to discern. Commentators argued 
that the design patent system should give way in favor of one or more of these 
other regimes: that it should be abolished in favor of sui generis legislation,34 that it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 28. J.H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative 
View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 267, 298 (1983). 
 29. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 30. Designers may be able to secure copyright protection for designs as pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006) (identifying pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works as a category of protectable work); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (supplying 
relevant definitions). 
 31. Designers may seek to register distinctive and nonfunctional designs as trade dress 
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1096 (2006), or may claim unregistered trade 
dress rights using Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 32. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (no requirement to elect 
between design patent protection and copyright protection); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 
372 F.2d 539, 545 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (no requirement to elect between design patent 
protection and registered trade dress protection); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 
925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (same). But cf. Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1329 (2006) (providing that the issuance of a design patent terminates vessel hull design 
protection). 
 33. Vessel hull designs may be protected under the provisions of Chapter 13 in 17 
U.S.C. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADE DRESS AND DESIGN LAW 566–72 
(2010) (explaining the relevant provisions). 
 34. Daniel H. Brean, Enough is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design Patents and Rely on 
More Appropriate Copyright and Trademark Protection for Product Designs, 16 TEX. 
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should be converted to a copyright model,35 and that it should be governed by 
unfair competition principles.36 
This has not occurred; instead, the design patent system has lingered. In the 
copyright and trademark jurisprudence, the design patent system has become a 
handy foil. For example, in Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros.,37 the Supreme Court cited 
the theoretical availability of design patent protection as one rationale for adopting 
an elevated standard of distinctiveness for product design trade dress protection.38 
Similarly, some judges hold up design patent protection as a preferred alternative to 
trade dress protection when invalidating trade dress protection on functionality 
grounds.39 Earlier, in Mazer v. Stein,40 the Court declared that the existence of 
design patent protection posed no obstacle to recognizing copyright protection for 
designs of useful articles because design patent protection was so uncertain.41 
                                                                                                                 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 379–81 (2008) (arguing that the design patent system should either 
be abolished or should be phased out and replaced with a system more akin to community 
design protection); Note, Design Protection—Time to Replace the Design Patent, 51 MINN. 
L. REV. 942, 959–61 (1967). 
 35. See, e.g., Roy V. Jackson, A New Approach to Protection for the Designs of New 
Products, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 448, 449 (1956) (arguing that design patent protection 
should be converted to a system of “engineering copyright” or “copyright-design”); Henry 
D. Williams, Copyright Registration of Industrial Designs, 7 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 540, 540 
(1924) (arguing that the design patent laws are a “misfit” and have been “altogether 
insufficient”). But cf. Frank W. Dahn, Designs—Patents or Copyrights, 10 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 297, 297 (1927) (discussing industrial design protection under the copyright and 
design patent systems, noting that “it is immaterial in a broad sense whether this be done by 
a copyright system or a patent system, so long as it is well done”). 
 36. Rudolf Callmann, Style and Design Piracy, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 557 (1940) 
(arguing that courts need to apply common law unfair competition law in design cases); see 
also Cameron K. Wehringer, Two for One: Trademarks and Design Patents, 50 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1158 (1960) (discussing the overlap between trademarks and design protection). 
 37. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 38. Id. at 215–16 (holding that product design trade dress cannot qualify as inherently 
distinctive as a matter of law). Similarly, Judge Easterbrook upheld the denial of a trade 
dress claim on the grounds that the table leg design at issue was not distinctive, commenting 
that the table manufacturer could have resorted to design patent or copyright protection to 
attempt to thwart copying. Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 580 
(7th Cir. 2005); see also Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix: Trade Dress 
Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 593, 696 (2010) (arguing 
that design patent and copyright alone suffice to provide adequate protection for designs, and 
that design protection as trade dress under the Lanham Act should be eliminated). 
Additionally, aesthetic and utilitarian functionality doctrines can create insurmountable 
hurdles for those claiming trade dress protection. See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti 
v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 39. See, e.g., Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 861 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Franek chose to pursue a trademark, not a design patent, to protect the stylish circularity of 
his beach towel. He must live with that choice.” (citation omitted)); see also Jason J. Du 
Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
261, 281–82 (2012) (comparing the use of the functionality doctrine in design patent law to 
its use in trade dress law). 
 40. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 41. Id.; see also BARBARA RINGER, DRAFT: SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE 
2013] DESIGNING THE AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM 845 
 
Decisions and commentary that attempt to capture the design patent system’s 
purpose by articulating its incentives rationale likewise leave us with many 
questions about the nexus between the design and utility patent systems. The most 
venerable comments—those of the Supreme Court in 1870 in Gorham Co. v. 
White42—assert merely that the design patent provisions “were plainly intended to 
give encouragement to the decorative arts,”43 a reference to the Constitution’s 
intellectual property clause,44 with a slight adaptation for designs.45 This strikes us 
as a placeholder recitation that reveals very little about whether the design patent 
system was intended to be robustly patent-like, since analogous constitutional 
language would be used to justify a design copyright scheme. Yet more recent 
rulings merely absorb the Gorham incantation without question. Indeed, in its 
recent landmark ruling on design patent infringement, the en banc Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit declared that the Gorham decision was “[t]he starting point 
for any discussion of the law of design patents.”46 
More recently, some scholars have shifted the focus to trademarks, exploring the 
connections between design patent protection and trademark incentive rationales. 
For example, Dennis Crouch has argued that design patents should be understood 
as an “alternative rule of evidence” for establishing trade dress rights.47 Similarly, 
Barton Beebe has suggested that the primary purpose of design patents is to 
incentivize product differentiation—to encourage producers to create and maintain 
distinctiveness, which is reminiscent of the trademark system’s function.48 In the 
case of high-technology consumer goods, as Beebe points out, consumers cannot 
readily evaluate whether the components of the goods provide superior 
technological utility, so consumers rely instead on the visual characteristics of the 
products as symbols of the product’s relative utility.49 The Gorham Court hints at a 
                                                                                                                 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 186 
(1975) (indicating that design patents were believed to be “inadequate as a practical form of 
protection” at the time of Mazer due to perceived judicial hostility, high cost, and delay 
encountered in the examination process). 
 42. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871). 
 43. Id.  
 44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to create systems that would 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). 
 45. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 525 (further suggesting that “[t]he law manifestly contemplates 
that giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its 
salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious service to the 
public”). The Court did cite a prior British design copyright case in support of its design 
patent infringement standard. Id. at 526 (citing McCrea v. Holdsworth, [1866] 1 Q.B. 263 
(Eng.)). We discuss the significance of British antecedents to American design patent law 
infra Part III. 
 46. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 47. Crouch, supra note 16, at 48. 
 48. Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 809, 862–64 (2010). Beebe sees much in common doctrinally between design patent 
and trademark. Id. at 863. 
 49. Id. at 864 (asserting that “[d]esign patents enable the designers of [high-technology 
consumer] products to convert the absolute utility that they have created into clearly 
demonstrable (and protectable) forms of relative utility, which may be the primary form of 
utility that high-technology consumers ultimately desire”). 
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product differentiation rationale, asserting that the law presumes that the designer’s 
act of “giving certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may 
enhance its salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a meritorious 
service to the public.”50 Beebe goes further, asserting that design protection laws, 
including design patent laws, “are probably the clearest examples we have of the 
‘functional transformation’ of intellectual property law into a body of law being 
used not simply to ‘promote the Progress,’ but also, and in tension with that goal, to 
preserve our system of consumption-based differentiation in the face of copying 
technology that threatens to undermine it.”51 For Beebe, this illustrates a broader 
distinction between “progressive” intellectual property (denoting intellectual 
property systems that seek to promote “progress” in the sense of advances in 
absolute utility) and sumptuary intellectual property (which merely strive to 
preserve differentiation among products).52 
We have some sympathy for Beebe’s argument, but for us it warrants closer 
historical scrutiny. Did the proponents of the original design patent system presume 
that industrial designers would supply “not so much beauty as distinction?”53 Or is 
it more likely that designers historically have sought to supply both beauty and 
distinction, a combination that is very difficult to disaggregate? 54 And, if so, what 
does this tell us about shaping incentives through a design patent system?55 
Historical analysis has something to contribute here, even if it does not yield tidy 
answers. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Gorham, 81 U.S. at 525. Further strands of this rationale can be seen in the Court’s 
description of the substantial similarity test for infringement—finding infringement where, 
“in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually 
gives, . . . the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase 
one [(i.e., the allegedly infringing design)] supposing it to be the other [(i.e., the patented 
design)].” Id. at 528. 
 51. Beebe, supra note 48, at 862. 
 52. Id. at 840. 
 53. Id. at 865. 
 54. In addition, as Beebe sees it, progressive intellectual property is oriented towards 
preventing substitutive copying, while sumptuary intellectual property seeks to prevent 
dilutive copying. Id. at 866–67. That may be true for high-end fashion designs, where, as 
Beebe points out, it seems unlikely that purveyors of luxury fashion items actually lose sales 
because ordinary consumers choose cheap counterfeits instead. Id. at 867. But we are not 
confident that this same generalization would have extended across many types of consumer 
goods manufacturers historically, where mimicry could plausibly have been both substitutive 
and dilutive. 
 55. For an argument that design patent rights and trademark rights supply comparable 
incentives, see Crouch, supra note 16, at 44 (asserting that design patent scope is so narrow 
that it could only provide low-level investment in design innovation and that consumer 
demand alone might extract this level of innovation). But these observations could point 
towards copyright incentives just as readily as they could point towards trademark 
incentives. 
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B. The “Historical Accident” Thesis 
Lastly, on the rare occasions when courts and commentators have focused 
directly on the design patent system’s genesis, they have tended to accept the 
proposition that the design patent system came about without deliberation. The 
eminent commentator Stephen Ladas dismissively characterized the passage of 
American design patent legislation as a “historical accident,”56 and others seem to 
have accepted this view.57 One historical commentary—and, until recently, the only 
account directed to the history of the design patent system—goes only a bit deeper. 
Thomas B. Hudson’s A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent 
Protection in the United States58 posits that the original design patent legislation 
passed because the Commissioner of Patents, Henry Ellsworth, recommended it in 
an annual Commissioner’s Report to Congress presented in early 1842,59 and, a few 
months later, Congress dutifully adopted Ellsworth’s recommendation.60 Hudson 
no doubt drew upon design patent treatises tracing back to the nineteenth century, 
which, likewise, presented the creation of the design patent system as an Ellsworth-
inspired fait accompli, or simply cited the 1842 Act without any background.61 
These summary explanations intrigued us. We sensed that there was more to be 
told62 and that telling it would be important in light of the ultimate normative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. STEPHEN P. LADAS, II PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 830 (1975). 
 57. See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1142 (2008); Richard W. Pogue, Borderland—Where Copyright and 
Design Patent Meet, 52 MICH. L. REV. 33, 62 (1953); Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration 
of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 934 (1939) (asserting that “[t]he fact that the law of 
design patents is following the precedents of mechanical patents rather than of copyrights is 
an accident of administration” and urging that “[i]t is due to their name and to their 
subjection to the jurisdiction of the Patent Office”). 
 58. 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 380 (1948). In fairness to Hudson, his account aimed 
primarily at describing the evolution of the design patent system in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, not at the factors that originally motivated Congress to enact 
design patent legislation. 
 59. See infra notes 182–93 and accompanying text. As we discuss, Ellsworth’s report 
referred to the existence of design protection in “other nations,” undoubtedly meaning the 
1839 British copyright and design legislation. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 60. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 (1842) [hereinafter Act of 
Aug. 29, 1842]; Hudson, supra note 58, at 381. Hudson does augment this account by briefly 
speculating why design patent protection took the form of patent protection, but he cites no 
support. Id. at 381–83. We analyze Hudson’s conjectures infra Part III.B, questioning some 
but agreeing with others. 
 61. See, e.g., HECTOR T. FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 1–2 (1889) 
(referencing the 1842 Act as the first design patent act without additional background); 
WILLIAM EDGAR SIMONDS, THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS 173 (1874) (same); WILLIAM 
LEONARD SYMONS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 5 (1914) (same). 
 62. Here we found particularly important the work by Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, 
showing that, in British law, early design legislation served as a prominent but little-
appreciated prototype for the eventual crystallization of modern notions of property rights in 
intangibles and modern structures of intellectual property laws. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL 
BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 
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problem of defining a role for the design patent system in future debates about 
intellectual property protection for designs. We attempt to provide more lucid and 
more fully contextualized explanations in the analysis presented in the following 
Parts. 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, DESIGN PIRACY, AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
DESIGN PROTECTION 
As we will show in this Part, the design patent regime emerged in response to 
the imperatives of technological innovation. We focus on the technological change 
in a leading antebellum American industry, the manufacture of cast-iron goods. We 
explain how technological innovation made it feasible for manufacturers to 
incorporate design features into mass-produced consumer goods, ushering in both 
the enterprise of American industrial design and the concomitant enterprise of 
American domestic design piracy. 
A. Innovation and Design Piracy in American Antebellum Manufacturing 
In the 1830s, American manufacturers produced cast-iron goods63 directly from 
iron ore using large blast furnaces located near iron ore sources and navigable 
waterways.64 Blast iron furnaces produced goods that were usually very coarse, 
heavy, and unrefined.65 Furnace operators did not specialize in particular products, 
so they had little interest in developing ornamentation or aesthetically pleasing 
configurations for particular products.66 Indeed, blast furnace operators were more 
concerned with the composition of the iron than the casting’s aesthetics. 
Jordan L. Mott, a leading New York manufacturer,67 revolutionized the 
processes for producing cast-iron goods, and, in short measure, became a principal 
lobbyist for expanding American intellectual property protection, particularly with 
regard to designs.68 Mott deserves mention as one of antebellum America’s 
foremost entrepreneurs, and as one of its consummate patent system insiders— 
credentials that he sought to preserve for posterity by commissioning a painting 
that depicts him in the Great Hall of the Patent Office in imaginary conversation 
                                                                                                                 
1760–1911, at 63–76 (1999). 
 63. An iron “cast” or “casting” is the actual shape or product that is created by pouring 
refined molten iron into a mold and allowing it to cool and solidify. See HUGH PHILIP 
TIEMANN, IRON AND STEEL 44–45 (1910). 
 64. See generally FREDERICK OVERMAN, THE MANUFACTURE OF IRON, IN ALL ITS 
VARIOUS BRANCHES 145–51 (1850) (depicting a typical blast furnace, fig. 49). 
 65. See IV JOHNSON’S NEW UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA: A SCIENTIFIC AND POPULAR 
TREASURY OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE 585 (Frederick A. P. Barnard & Arnold Guyot eds., 
1878) [hereinafter JOHNSON’S NEW UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA]. 
 66. See DAVID R. MEYER, NETWORKED MACHINISTS: HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES IN 
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 110 (2006). 
 67. At one time, Mott’s sprawling real estate holdings encompassed most of Brooklyn. 
See PROMINENT FAMILIES OF NEW YORK 420 (BiblioLife ed., 2009) (Lyman H. Weeks ed., 
1897). 
 68. See infra Part II. 
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with Morse, Colt, Goodyear, and other legendary American inventors.69 His vanity 
was not in question. 
In the 1830s, Mott had begun producing the first practical coal-fired, cast-iron 
stoves and had sold them to customers in New York City.70 At first, he did not 
make his own castings; instead, he bought them from blast furnace operators who 
produced them and shipped them to him for assembly.71 Seeking to end his 
dependence on the blast furnace operators,72 Mott built a small-scale cupola furnace 
in the city73 and, after some experimentation, determined how to produce his own 
castings using pig iron.74 Compared to cast-iron plates made directly from ore by 
blast furnaces, cupola furnaces produced thinner, lighter castings, but they were 
more susceptible to cracking when heated.75 To overcome this problem, he 
incorporated curves, fluting, and other features aimed at enhancing heat 
dissipation.76 
According to one account, Mott’s innovative process “gained the attention of 
iron men, and before the close of the year cupola furnaces began to be erected, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. The painting is Men of Progress by Christian Schussele, circa 1857. For 
background, see Henry Petroski, Men and Women of Progress, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 216, 216–
17 (1994). At about that same time, President Buchanan asked Mott to become the 
Commissioner of Patents, but Mott ultimately declined. PROMINENT FAMILIES OF NEW YORK, 
supra note 67, at 420. 
 70. Mott had secured utility patent protection for an anthracite-burning coal, and he had 
determined how to use “pea-sized” coal (previously considered to be scrap) as stove fuel. 4 
AMERICAN SUPPLEMENT TO ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, 
AND GENERAL LITERATURE 606 (J.M. Stoddart ed., 1889); Stoves, U.S. Patent No. 7,096X 
(issued May 30, 1832). This innovation revolutionized the stove industry. JOHNSON’S NEW 
UNIVERSAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 65, at 585. 
 71. See 2 J. LEANDER BISHOP, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO 
1860, at 576–77 (3d ed. 1868) [hereinafter AMERICAN MANUFACTURES]. 
 72. Mott became dissatisfied with the prices that blast furnace operators were charging 
him, according to at least one account. Id. at 577. 
 73. See William Dundas Scott-Moncrieff, The Cupola Furnace and “Castings,” in 
GREAT INDUSTRIES OF GREAT BRITAIN 111 (Cassell & Co. ed., 1884) (describing the cupola 
furnace); AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, supra note 71, at 577 (describing the location of 
Mott’s cupola furnace). 
 74. See AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, supra note 71, at 577. 
 75. Id. at 576–77. 
 76. Id. at 577 (“Mr. Mott made his plate patterns ‘from edge to edge longer than a 
straight line,’ by pannelling, curving, fluting, or other device.”); Conversational Meeting of 
the Mechanics Institute, Reported for the American Repertory, Subject Stoves (Feb. 1840) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript 
Library, Mott Family Papers, Box 2). Signed “Ed’s Notes,” this manuscript appears to have 
been produced during an interview with Jordan Mott while a member of the Mechanic’s 
Institute. It notes that Mott’s insight concerning the stove’s surface area improved the iron’s 
heat radiation properties to the point where they no longer had to line the stoves with brick. 
For an example of one of Mott’s designs utilizing these techniques, see Stove & Fireplace, 
U.S. Patent No. 50 (issued Oct. 11, 1836) (Figs. 1–3) (utilizing separate concentric rings in 
scalloped, notched, and leaf patterns in order to dissipate heat but noting that their 
“ornament” was “merely a thing of fancy, or taste”). 
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soon spread over the cities and villages of the Union.”77 Mott and others could now 
cast their own stoves on a commercial scale.78 Subsequent advances in thin-casting 
techniques, among other factors,79 facilitated explosive growth in the production of 
a wide array of additional cast-iron goods, including “kitchen utensils, sugar-
kettles, bath-tubs, . . . cast-iron railings, fountains, and lawn ornaments.”80 Some of 
Mott’s innovative stove and chair designs are depicted below.81 
 
 
 
Once they adopted thin-casting techniques, Mott and other manufacturers 
suddenly found that a new and unexpected opportunity for innovation had opened 
to them. They could now add value to cast-iron consumer goods on a commercial 
scale by crafting innovative, distinctive designs. That is, by incorporating 
ornamentation, or by adopting daring new geometries for their products, they might 
lend their products aesthetic appeal and simultaneously provide consumers a basis 
for differentiating between competing products. 
Iron goods manufacturers employed pattern makers who carved new patterns 
using soft woods, plaster, or soft metals;82 casting molds were then made from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77.  AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, supra note 71, at 577. Some evidence suggests that 
others in addition to Mott were experimenting with the use of cupola furnaces at the same 
time. See Jeremiah Dwyer, Stoves and Heating Apparatus, in 2 ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN COMMERCE 357, 361 (Chauncy M. Depew ed., 1895) (stating that Mott was “one 
of the first to use a cupola for remelting iron for stove manufacture”). 
 78. See, e.g., RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, MORE WORK FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF 
HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY FROM THE OPEN HEARTH TO THE MICROWAVE 60 (1983) (crediting 
Mott as the first to actually “make” stoves, instead of just assembling them). 
 79. See Charles Huston, The Iron and Steel Industry, in 1 ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN COMMERCE 320, 323 (Chauncey M. Depew ed., 1895) (noting that the growth of 
the railroad network profoundly affected the growth of the iron industry); F.W. TAUSSIG, 
THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (6th ed. 1914) (attributing U.S. iron industry 
growth in the 1830s principally to the introduction of anthracite coal-based smelting, 
replacing charcoal smelting). 
 80. VICTOR S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1607–1860, 
at 504 (1916). 
 81. The featured design diagrams and their corresponding citations are listed from left to 
right: Stove & Fireplace, U.S. Patent No. 50 fig. 3 (issued Oct. 11, 1836); Cast-Iron Chair, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,317 fig. 1 (issued Oct. 2, 1847); Stove & Fireplace, U.S. Patent No. 50 fig. 
2 (issued Oct. 11, 1836); and Parlor-Stove, U.S. Patent No. 508 fig. 1 (issued Dec. 7, 1837). 
 82. See ALONZO POTTER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE APPLIED TO THE DOMESTIC AND 
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patterns.83 According to contemporary observers, the pattern maker’s design work 
was “almost entirely executed by hand, entailing a heavy expense and the 
consumption of considerable time.”84 Once made, the patterns could be used 
repeatedly, so they were of great value, so much so that some firms created fire-
resistant “pattern houses” for their storage.85 Advertisements began to emphasize 
the ornamental attributes of cast-iron goods,86 and, for the first time, some cast-iron 
goods came to be perceived as works of art.87 
The phenomenon was not confined to the cast-iron goods market. A more 
general enterprise of American industrial design was beginning to emerge. As 
Arthur Pulos points out, a consumer “could always depend on what his senses told 
him” about a product even if he found the mechanics of the product to be baffling.88 
Many manufacturers “began to pay particular attention to the notion that artistic 
values applied to utilitarian manufactures might also increase their saleability.”89 
Still, American cast-iron goods designers had no apparent, formal intellectual 
property mechanism available for capturing the value attributable to design. 
Copyright protection was an obvious candidate (at least as viewed in retrospect), 
but copyright protection did not embrace industrial creations, entirely omitting 
protection for three-dimensional useful articles until many decades later90 and only 
affording protection in limited instances for surface ornamentation applied to two-
                                                                                                                 
MECHANIC ARTS, AND TO MANUFACTURES AND AGRICULTURE 214 (1860). 
 83. See generally Babbage on the Economy of Manufactures, 2 AM. RAILROAD J. & 
ADVOC. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 353, 359 (1833) (“Patterns of wood or metal made from 
drawings are the originals from which the moulds for casting are made: so that, in fact, the 
casting itself is a copy of the mould, and the mould is a copy of the pattern.”); 2 SUPPLEMENT 
TO SPONS’ DICTIONARY OF ENGINEERING 618–72 (Ernest Spon ed., 1880) (detailing the 
casting process). 
 84. 4 AMERICAN SUPPLEMENT TO ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 70, at 606. 
 85. Ellen Marie Snyder, Victory over Nature: Victorian Cast-Iron Seating Furniture, 20 
WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 221, 224 (1985). 
 86. See, e.g., Priscilla J. Brewer, “We Have Got a Very Good Cooking Stove”: 
Advertising, Design, and Consumer Response to the Cookstove, 1815–1880, 25 
WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 35, 43 (1990) (identifying an 1844 stove advertisement illustrating 
that the stove’s appearance had become an important consideration in stove marketing); 
Snyder, supra note 85, at 227 (noting that trade catalogues for cast-iron products extolled 
their visual appearance and finding that even Mott’s catalogue grandly boasted that it 
contained nothing that did “not possess some artistic merit”). 
 87. Snyder, supra note 85, at 226 (referring to a perception of cast-iron’s “aesthetic 
elevation” to art). 
 88. PULOS, supra note 9, at 133. 
 89. Id. 
 90. The Act of July 8, 1870, defined copyrightable subject matter to include “statuary, 
and . . . models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts.” Act of July 8, 
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212. In 1909, Congress amended the provision 
substantially, deleting the “fine arts” language and providing that copyright protection could 
extend to all works of authorship. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 
1076. Eventually, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court concluded that 
these changes extended copyright beyond the traditional fine arts to industrial designs such 
as the statuettes at issue in Mazer, which were intended to be used as bases for lamps. Id. at 
213–14. 
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dimensional objects.91 No federal trademark regime existed, and common law 
unfair competition precedents, which were sparse at the time, offered no clear basis 
for the protection of designs as trade dress.92 Lastly, utility patent law protected 
industrial creations but not their visual aspects.93 Indeed, writing with the benefit of 
hindsight, William Edgar Simonds averred that the classes of “intellectual 
productions” divided neatly into three: “books, maps, charts, cuts, engravings, 
prints, and musical compositions” (all protected by copyright at the time); “new 
and useful arts, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, and 
improvements thereon” (protectable under the utility patent regime); and “a third 
class to which no protection had been given, comprising . . . patterns, figures, or 
pictures to be woven into, or printed or impressed upon textile fabrics, as carpets, 
shawls[,] and dress goods.”94 
Our research suggests that, prior to 1836, some entrepreneurs were attempting to 
use the utility patent regime to obtain design protection sub rosa. From 1793 to 
1836, the utility patent system did not subject patent applications to substantive 
examination prior to grant,95 so patents could issue without ever having been 
scrutinized for compliance with substantive patentability requirements—including 
requirements for eligible subject matter. While stove makers were certainly using 
the utility patent system to protect technological innovations embodied in their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. In particular, Congress extended copyright protection to engravings and etchings in 
1802. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (extending copyright protection 
to “who[ever] shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work, or from his own works and 
inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched or worked, any historical or 
other print or prints”). 
 92. See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 7:62 (4th ed. 2009) (identifying the 1917 crescent wrench decision, Crescent 
Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917), as the first true American 
product design trade dress case). 
 93. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 [hereinafter Patent Act of 1793] 
(providing that utility patent protection extended to “any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter”). We have found no evidence of any 
argument to extend this language to ornamental design, except for a somewhat cryptic 
remark from the treatise writer Willard Phillips. Phillips claimed that the French Patent Law 
of 1791 rejected protection for “mere ornaments” as not the proper subject for utility patents 
and then asserted:  
[T]his appears to be a very questionable position, for it would never be 
contended in case of an invention of which a part was ornamental merely, that 
this part might be infringed with impunity; and there appears to be no more 
ground for yielding any more protection to ornamental parts in an original 
invention, than in an improvement, or in a case where a part of the invention 
was ornamental, than one which should be wholly confined to ornament.  
WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 135 (1836). 
 94. WILLIAM EDGAR SIMONDS, THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS 183 (1874). According to 
Simonds, design patent protection was intended for the benefit of this third, unprotected 
class. Id. at 184. As we have suggested throughout this paper, the creation of the design 
patent system was not quite so conceptually pure. 
 95. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: 
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 427 (1998). 
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cast-iron stoves, at least one stove maker attempted to use the utility patent regime 
to obtain the equivalent of design protection. Walter Hunt, one of the nineteenth 
century’s most prolific inventors,96 developed a globe-shaped heating stove that 
was said to permit radiated heat to be distributed equally in all directions.97 Hunt 
filed a utility patent application that not only detailed the construction and 
functional advantages of the globe-shaped stove body but also included a drawing 
in which the stove’s body was adorned with depictions of the continents (below, 
left).98 
 
 
 
Hunt included three claims in the application, the first of which suggests that he 
may have been asserting exclusive rights over both the functional and the visual 
aspects of the stove: 
I claim the style, general arrangement and fashion of the above 
described Radiator or Globe Stove believing the peculiar advantages of 
said arrangement in the generating and equal diffusion of heat 
exclusively confined to the globe or spheroid form as a reservoir of 
fuel . . . which cannot be effected by the regular or cylindrical stove.99 
An early advertisement for the stove not only highlights its useful features but 
also indicates that “[p]atterns may be seen at the [Globe Stove] office.”100 The 
patent drawings depict additional ornamentation, likewise suggesting that the 
Globe Stove was about more than merely functional advantages.101 Hunt’s example 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See generally JOSEPH NATHAN KANE, NECESSITY’S CHILD: THE STORY OF WALTER 
HUNT, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN INVENTOR (1997). Hunt’s pioneering work on sewing 
machines later figured prominently in massive patent litigation in that industry. See Adam 
Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War 
of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 187–90 (2011). 
 97. KANE, supra note 96, at 63. 
 98. Heating Stove, U.S. Patent No. 8,006X fig. 1 (issued Feb. 8, 1834) (Fig. 1, depicted 
on the left). The drawing on the right is Figure 2 from the patent, a partial cutaway view 
depicting the stove’s interior construction. 
 99. Id. at 84–85 (claim 1) (emphasis added); see also KANE, supra note 96, at 63. 
 100. KANE, supra note 96, at 61 (reprinting an advertising sheet dated Nov. 1833 for 
“Hunt’s Patent Radiator, or Globe Stove”). 
 101. See ’006X Patent fig.1; see also The Globe Stove, N.Y. COM. ADVERTISER, Nov. 7, 
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is particularly noteworthy because he eventually joined Mott in lobbying for design 
protection legislation, as we discuss in more detail below.102 
The appropriability problem that was developing in the cast-iron goods industry 
was also plaguing the New England textile industry in America.103 Design piracy 
became particularly widespread in the American textile industry in the 1830s.104 
Ornate calico prints produced at the New England factories of Francis Lowell (and 
fellow Boston Associates) had become so popular that they had “displace[d] the 
linseys, checks, and homespun plaids” that local artisans had traditionally sold.105 
As firms came to produce calico design patterns on an ever-expanding scale, 
competitors inevitably sought to mimic those patterns.106 However, American 
intellectual property law provided no apparent recourse. 
Intellectual property scholars will find this narrative familiar. It is a classic 
exemplar of the public goods problem of intellectual property lore.107 Predictions of 
an intellectual property law response would fit amicably within Harold Demsetz’s 
thesis for the emergence of private property rights.108 An intellectual property 
response was predictable for another reason: an analogous situation had developed 
in Great Britain. 
B. Design Piracy in Great Britain and the Intellectual Property Law Response 
As American manufacturers came to realize, a similar saga of technological 
advance had spurred a legislative response in Great Britain. Cotton textile 
manufacturers in northern England and Scotland had adopted technological 
                                                                                                                 
1833, at 2 (“[F]rom the beauty and perfection of some of the castings we have seen, it can be 
made as ornamental as need be desired.”). 
 102. See infra Part III. Like Mott, Hunt manufactured stoves in New York City. See 
KANE, supra note 96, at 66 (noting that Hunt identified himself in city directories as a stove 
maker in New York City). Mott, in turn, was apparently familiar with Hunt’s work on the 
globe-stove. See, e.g., Coal-Stove, U.S. Patent No. 4,247 (issued Nov. 1, 1845) (noting his 
awareness of Hunt’s globe-stove). 
 103. Indeed, the problem fits a classic pattern; it has been duplicated in many settings and 
has driven much intellectual property policy over the decades. See, e.g., ADRIAN JOHNS, 
PIRACY (2009). 
 104. See PAUL E. RIVARD, A NEW ORDER OF THINGS: HOW THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
TRANSFORMED NEW ENGLAND 68–69 (2002) (characterizing design copying as standard 
practice). 
 105. CLARK, supra note 80, at 547. 
 106. Copying textile print patterns did require some skill. A would-be copyist had to be 
capable of decoding the pattern’s elements, engraving them for rollers, and then determining 
the proper blend of dyes. RIVARD, supra note 104, at 68–69. 
 107. Indeed, analogous problems in the British textile industry had generated design 
legislation that took its cue from copyright law, and American lobbyists drew on the British 
experience to formulate their proposals, as we discuss further infra Part III. 
 108. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350 (1967) (positing that changes in technology or markets stimulate the creation and 
capture of emerging economic value through private property rights). We do not mean to 
suggest that the Demsetzian account provides a comprehensive explanation for the creation 
of the design patent system. As we show infra Part III, a number of domestic political factors 
also contributed to the enactment of the design patent provisions. 
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innovations in printer cylinders that enabled them to print patterns over continuous 
lengths of cloth, on a large scale, and at previously unheard-of rates.109 However, 
these manufacturers quickly found that consumers preferred the patterns they 
associated with London-based manufacturers,110 so they copied those patterns and 
used them to produce calico prints in quantities far exceeding their originators.111 
Not surprisingly, by the late 1700s, the London calico manufacturers were 
complaining to Parliament.112 Because contemporary English copyright law 
protected engravers and authors but not textile pattern makers,113 Parliament 
enacted new legislation, the Calico Printers’ Act of 1787,114 which conferred 
protection on persons “who shall invent, design, and print . . . any new and original 
pattern . . . for printing linens, cottons, callicos, or muslins.”115 By the early 1800s, 
an active debate in England about expanding the Act culminated in a radical new 
design protection system beginning in 1839.116 We discuss its details below and 
explain how it came to be used as a model for American law. 
III. DESIGN PATENT LAW’S AMBIVALENT LEGISLATIVE ANCESTRY 
In view of the technological context that we have explored in Part II, we now 
turn to an analysis of the design patent system’s legislative ancestry. Relying on 
newly uncovered source material, we describe the first proposal for American 
design protection legislation, which was styled as copyright legislation and 
borrowed heavily from British design copyright law. We then recount the 
disappearance of the first proposal and the emergence of a second—newly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. See, e.g., Lara Kriegel, Culture and the Copy: Calico, Capitalism, and Design 
Copyright in Early Victorian Britain, 43 J. BRIT. STUD. 233, 238–39 (2004). 
 110. See id. at 239–40. 
 111. Id. at 240. 
 112. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 62, at 63 n.3. 
 113. See Engraving Copyright Act, 1734, 8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (Eng.), amended by Engraving 
Copyright Act, 1766, 7 Geo. 3, c. 38 (Eng.), amended by Prints Copyright Act, 1777, 17 
Geo. 3, c. 57 (Eng.). 
 114. An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing and printing Linens, 
Cottons, Callicoes, and Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, Printers, 
and Proprietors, for a limited Time, 27 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1787) (Eng.) [hereinafter Calico 
Printers’ Act]. 
 115. Id. § 1. Protection endured only for two months, a reflection of the staunch 
opposition that the northern cotton factories mounted. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 62, at 
63 n.3. Parliament initially enacted the Calico Printers’ Act for only one year, see Calico 
Printers’ Act § 3, but extended it successively. See An Act for continuing an Act made in the 
twenty-seventh Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled [sic], An Act for the 
Encouragement of the Arts of designing and printing Linens, Cottons, Callicoes, and 
Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, Printers, and Proprietors for a 
limited Time, 29 Geo. 3, c. 19 (1789) (Eng.), made perpetual by An Act for amending and 
making perpetual an Act made in the twenty-seventh Year of the Reign of his present 
Majesty, intituled [sic], An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of Designing and Printing 
Linens, Cottons, Calicoes, and Muslins, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Designers, 
Printers, and Proprietors, for a limited Time, 34 Geo. 3, c. 23 (1794) (Eng.). 
 116. See infra Part III. 
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characterized as patent legislation. We show why this new proposal likely sprang 
from considerations of bureaucratic self-interest, not from any perceived distinction 
between the relative merits of copyright and patent protection for designs. We 
conclude by showing that the ultimate passage of the design patent legislation 
likely resulted from external political forces—specifically, a protectionist surge 
advocated by the Whig Party and bitterly opposed by the Jacksonian Democrats. 
A. The Mott and Ruggles Proposals: Design Patent’s Genesis in British Design 
Copyright117 
Stove manufacturer Jordan L. Mott set in motion the proposals that eventually 
grew into the design patent legislation. In February 1841, Mott, on behalf of 
himself and numerous signatories, petitioned Congress for design protection.118 
Noting that designs were not eligible for utility patent protection, Mott’s petition 
argued that “improvements . . . in articles of manufacture ha[d] rendered necessary 
a registration of new designs and patterns.”119 These designs “require[d] a 
considerable expenditure of time and money, and c[ould] be . . . use[d] . . . by any 
person so disposed, in such a manner as to undersell the inventor or proprietor.”120 
Above all, the petitioners did not call for copyright or patent protection but for a 
registration.121 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. To our knowledge, scholars have never previously analyzed the Ruggles bill 
discussed in this section. Ruggles’s introduction of both the petition on February 3, 1841, 
and the bill on February 27, 1841, were misclassified in the Congressional Globe’s index 
under the heading “Patent Office, report of the Commissioner, showing operations of, for the 
past year,” see CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. index at 6 (1841), which may explain 
why previous researchers have not uncovered it. 
 118. See JORDAN L. MOTT ET AL., PETITION OF A NUMBER OF MANUFACTURERS AND 
MECHANICS OF THE UNITED STATES, PRAYING THE ADOPTION OF MEASURES TO SECURE TO 
THEM THEIR RIGHTS IN PATTERNS AND DESIGNS, S. DOC. NO. 26-154 (2d Sess. 1841) 
[hereinafter MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION]. It is not clear whether Jordan Mott was a Whig, or 
whether he was otherwise in a position to harness Whig political forces to press his proposal 
forward. We do know that Mott was not shy about lobbying prominent Whigs about 
intellectual property matters. In an 1851 debate over utility patent legislation, Mott 
corresponded with the nation’s most prominent Whig, Henry Clay, receiving a polite but 
peremptory response. See Letter from Jordan L. Mott to Henry Clay (Jan. 24, 1851), in 10 
THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY 848 (Melba Porter Hay ed., 1991). One year later, Mott was 
chosen to serve as an aid in the grand procession in New York City in observance of Henry 
Clay’s death, see Programme of Arrangements for the Funeral Ceremonies of the Late Hon. 
Henry Clay, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, July 19, 1852, at 1, though we cannot say whether this 
indicates Mott’s Whiggish tendencies or merely his substantial prominence in New York. 
 119. MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. (estimating that it only cost the copier “one-hundredth of the expense which it 
has cost the original manufacturer”). Intellectual property scholars will recognize this as a 
classic invocation of the public goods problem. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 19–20 (2003) 
(providing a general discussion). 
 121. MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118, at 1. 
2013] DESIGNING THE AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM 857 
 
Moreover, after noting that fabric designers faced similar obstacles, the 
petitioners were quick to point out that Great Britain had recently passed such 
rights for their citizens.122 They argued: 
 Your petitioners believe that the manufacturers and mechanics of the 
United States are not surpassed by those of any other country, in the 
durability and utility of the articles manufactured by them; and they 
confidently affirm that the articles manufactured by them would equal any 
others in beauty, if new designs and patterns were secured by registration.123 
Thus, design protection was cast not only as a problem of domestic free riding, but 
also as an international trade problem.124 
Although the copy of Mott’s petition reprinted in the U.S. Congressional Serial 
Set125 includes only the text of the petition itself, additional archival research turned 
up a reproduction of the original that included the petitioners’ signatures, including 
that of Walter Hunt, the inventor of the Globe Stove.126 Some signatories also listed 
their occupations. A study of these signatories provides a rare glimpse into the 
grassroots politics of early American lobbying efforts in intellectual property. They 
were all male (not surprisingly) and all from the Northeast: predominantly New 
York and New Jersey, along with Connecticut, and the cities of Philadelphia and 
Boston. A few appear to have been Whigs,127 but we are unable to determine 
whether the petitioners originated predominantly from Whig party rolls. Most who 
identified their occupation appear to have been tradesmen: a manufacturer, an 
engineer, a “designer in mechanics,” three “mechanists,” and various others.128 
It is perhaps significant that some of the listed professions involved subject 
matter that lay at the margins of traditional copyright and patent regimes—and still 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Id. (citing An Act to secure to Proprietors of Designs for Articles of Manufacture the 
Copyright of such Designs for a limited Time, 2 Vict., c. 17 (1839) (Eng.) [hereinafter 
Designs Registration Act, 1839]). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra Part II (discussing this aspect of design patent’s origins). 
 125. See MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118, at 2 (identifying signatories only 
as “JORDAN L. MOTT and others”). 
 126. Our appreciation to Kenneth Kato, Center for Legislative Archives, National 
Archives and Records Administration, for assistance in procuring the signature pages. Scans 
of the signature pages are on file with authors. 
 127. For example, J.W. Warren of Boston appears to have been a newspaper editor and 
Whig party member. See CHRISTIAN WATCHMAN, Mar. 3, 1837, § 18, at 9 (reporting on 
Warren’s editorship of the Christian Witness); Public Meeting, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Mar. 5, 
1852, at 2 (listing Warren as a supporter of the Whig nomination of Daniel Webster for 
President). Andrew Anderson of Jersey City likewise may have been involved in Whig 
politics, at least as of the 1850s. See Jersey City: Whig Primary Meeting, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, 
Apr. 6, 1854, at 3. 
 128. One signatory was Joseph Priestley—not the famous scientist credited with the 
discovery of oxygen, who passed away in 1804, but perhaps an heir. For biographical 
background on the famous Priestley, see STEVEN JOHNSON, THE INVENTION OF AIR (2008). 
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does. For example, Isaac Edge, Jr., of Jersey City, was a renowned designer of 
fireworks displays.129 Joseph E. Ebling of New York was a confectioner.130 
Another signatory, Samuel Loomis of Connecticut, was probably from the 
famed Loomis family of furniture designers.131 If so, this shows good foresight. 
Design protection (including by design patent) has proven especially important for 
furniture designers over the years.132 Yet another signatory appears to have been an 
inventor of prosthetic limbs, which eventually obtained utility patent protection.133 
Senator John Ruggles from Maine,134 former chair of the Senate’s Committee on 
Patents and the Patent Office,135 presented Mott’s petition to Congress136 and, 
within weeks, followed up with a legislative proposal.137 Ruggles was a logical 
sponsor for the legislation given his reputation as a leader in Congress on 
intellectual property matters, but he also may have had a family interest in the bill. 
John Ruggles’s brother, Draper Ruggles,138 was a partner in the largest cast-iron 
plow and agricultural implement company in the United States—Ruggles, Nourse 
& Mason.139 In addition, the firm apparently had business connections with Mott, 
acting as a distributor for Mott’s famous agricultural furnace.140 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. See Classified Advertisement, Edge’s First Premium Fireworks, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, June 
29, 1854, at 5 (representative advertisement of the Edge family’s displays); Independence Day: 
Celebration of the “Glorious Fourth,” N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1854, at 1 (reporting that the Edge 
family had been hired by New York City for the July 4th fireworks celebration). 
 130. MANUFACTURERS’ PETITION, supra note 118 (signature page). 
 131. Loomis furniture is on display in the Wadsworth Atheneum Museum of Art as 
examples of the Colchester/Norwich furniture style. See American Decorative, WADSWORTH 
ATHENEUM MUSEUM ART, http://www.thewadsworth.org/american-decorative/. 
 132. For a recent example from the design patent area, see Amini Innovation Corp. v. 
Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 133. William Selpho of New York. See Construction of Artificial Hands, U.S. Patent No. 
18,021 (issued Aug. 18, 1857); Construction of Artificial Legs, U.S. Patent No. 14,836 
(issued May 6, 1856). 
 134. For general biographical information on Ruggles, see 12 THE NATIONAL 
CYCLOPÆDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 230 (1904). Regarding the family’s political 
prominence, see FRANCES COWLES, THE FAMILY OF RUGGLES 8–9 (1912). 
 135. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1837) (noting Ruggles’s position as 
Committee chair). 
 136. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1841). The petition was ordered for 
printing and referred to the Committee on Patents and the Patent Office. Id. 
 137. For promoting the progress of the useful arts, by securing the right of invention and 
copy-right to proprietors of new designs for manufactures, for limited times, S. 269, 26th 
Cong. (1841) [hereinafter Ruggles Design Bill]; CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 
(1841) (reporting that Senator Ruggles “asked and obtained leave to introduce a bill granting 
copy-rights to inventors of designs, &c., which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
on Patents and the Patent Office”). 
 138. HENRY RUGGLES, ANCESTRY OF JUDGE THOMAS RUGGLES, OF COLUMBIA FALLS, 
MAINE, AND JUDGE JOHN RUGGLES OF THOMASTON, MAINE 36–37 (1924) (Maine Historical 
Society). We are especially indebted to Jamie Kingman Rice, public services librarian at the 
Maine Historical Society, and Maribel Nash, reference librarian at the Pritzker Legal 
Research Center at Northwestern School of Law, for this point. 
 139. See CHARLES G. WASHBURN, INDUSTRIAL WORCESTER 132–33 (1917). See generally 
2 J. LEANDER BISHOP, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES FROM 1608 TO 1860, at 701–
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The bill was styled as a design copyright proposal. It proposed a “sole and 
exclusive copy-right” for the proprietor of any “new and original design”141 for 
specified articles of manufacture.142 The list of specified articles explicitly 
responded to the wishes of the iron and textile industries. It included “linen, cotton, 
calico, muslin, or other textile fabric,”143 ornamentation on any article other than a 
textile fabric,144 and the shape or configuration of any article not falling into the 
                                                                                                                 
02 (1864) (providing some background on the partnership and their successor Oliver Ames 
& Sons’ Agricultural Implement Manufactory). Draper Ruggles also figured in an important 
early utility patent infringement case. See Prouty v. Ruggles, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 
(1842) (espousing an all-elements rule for utility patent infringement). Draper Ruggles was 
likely the unnamed “brother” continually referred to in the Select Committee’s investigation 
into Senator John Ruggles’s activities with Henry C. Jones. See Hugh L. White, Senate 
Select Committee Report, S. DOC. NO. 25-377, at 9, 12, 16, 17, 19, 56, 68 (1838). According 
to the report, Ruggles allegedly sought to secure patent rights for a brother who lived in 
Worcester, Massachusetts, and who already had a half interest in a patented plough. See id. 
at 9. Although the exact plough is unknown, Draper Ruggles’s iron manufactory in 
Worcester owned the patents to numerous ploughs and agricultural implements during this 
time, and the report is probably referring to Ruggles’s ownership of Jethro Wood’s patented 
plough. See WASHBURN, supra, at 132. 
 140. See Mott’s Agricultural Furnace, ME. FARMER, Jan. 8, 1846, at 1 (explaining that 
Mott’s furnace could be purchased at the Ruggles, Nourse & Mason warehouse in Boston 
and including a drawing of a 22 gallon model); Advertisement, Mott’s Agricultural Furnace, 
ME. FARMER, Oct. 15, 1846, at 1. 
 141. Although these terms were eventually adopted by the legislature, and even 
developed into the same novelty and originality standards that we think of today as 
distinguishing patent and copyright law, it is not clear what Senator Ruggles meant by “new 
and original.” See infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing their contemporary 
meanings under British law). Indeed, it took over a quarter of a century for this distinction to 
develop in U.S. law, and their meanings under both regimes were in flux during this time. 
See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in 
Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 181–209 (1989) (tracing the novelty 
standard); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 469–82 
(2009) (tracing the originality standard); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) 
(distinguishing patent and copyright, in part, by novelty and one component of the modern 
originality standard, independent creation). Although the requirements have different 
meanings today, contemporary courts often used them interchangeably and across both 
regimes—broadly requiring the combined elements of a copyrightable work or a patentable 
invention to be produced by the author or inventor’s intensive labor or creativity. See Miller, 
supra, at 469–75. Joseph Miller points out that “[t]he contemporary taboo against comparing 
originality [in copyright] to nonobviousness[, invention, or novelty (in patent)] is just that—
contemporary.” Id. at 471. The modern design patent act’s retention of these terms (new and 
original) stands as one of the few fossilized reminders of patent and copyright’s common 
history. 
 142. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841). 
 143. Id. (offering protection “[f]or the pattern or print to be either worked, stamped, 
printed, or painted, into or on any article of manufactured linen, cotton, calico, muslin, or 
other textile fabric”). 
 144. Id. (offering protection “[f]or the modelling [sic], or the casting, or the embossment, 
or the chasing, or engraving, or for any other kind of impression or ornament, on any article 
of manufacture not being a textile fabric”). 
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previously mentioned categories.145 The copyright term was one year,146 except 
where the design was for ornamentation on an article “made of metal,” the term 
was three years.147 
Ruggles’s bill provided that the proposed design copyright would only come 
into force upon registration.148 However, registration would be issued only if, “on 
examination” by the Patent Office,149 the design appeared to be “new and 
original,”150 assuming that the applicant also paid the requisite filing fee151 and 
complied with other formalities.152 The registered rights-holder received a right to 
institute an infringement action against anyone who “shall adopt and use” the 
registered design during the term of the registration.153 
Most of the concepts in Ruggles’s bill, and even many of the key passages, were 
not original. They had been borrowed from Britain’s dual copyright system for 
designs, enacted scarcely two years earlier.154 One component of the dual system, 
the British Copyright of Designs Act (1839), extended copyright protection to new 
and original155 patterns for printing “Linens, Cottons, Calicoes, or Muslins,”156—
the same list that later appeared in Ruggles’s proposal.157 The other component, the 
Design Registrations Act (1839), protected three categories of subject matter: (1) 
any “Pattern or Print, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed on or 
painted on, any Article of Manufacture”; (2) designs “[f]or the Modeling, or the 
Casting, or the Embossment, or the Chasing, or the Engraving, or for any other 
Kind of Impression or Ornament, on any Article of Manufacture, not being a Tissue 
or textile Fabric”; and lastly (3) “the Shape or Configuration of any Article of 
Manufacture.”158 Ruggles borrowed this three-part structure and substituted the list 
of fabrics into the first category, converting the British dual system into a unified 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 4. 
 150. Id.; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the “new and 
original” requirement). 
 151. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 6 (1841). 
 152. Id. § 4. 
 153. Id. § 3. Recovery for infringement ranged from $20 to $200 and was contingent on 
marking. Id. Unfortunately, this innovation did not make its way into the 1842 Act. See Act 
of Aug. 29, 1842, supra note 60. Because of the palpable difficulty of proving that a 
defendant’s profits from an infringing product were attributable to the protected design—and 
not other things like marketing or functionality—Congress eventually provided a minimum 
recovery for willful infringement in 1887. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, § 1, 24 Stat. 387; see 
also Frederic H. Betts, Some Questions Under the Design Patent Act of 1887, 1 YALE L.J. 181, 182–
83 (1892). 
 154. Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.); An Act for Extending the 
Copyright of Designs for Calico Printing to Designs for Printing other Woven Fabrics, 2 
Vict., c. 13 (1839) (Eng.) [hereinafter Calico Act, 1839]. 
 155. See infra note 164. 
 156. Calico Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 13, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.) (additionally extending protection to 
“other Fabrics of a similar Nature,” which included fabrics composed of wool, silk, or hair, 
and any mixture thereof). 
 157. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841). 
 158. Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.). 
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system of protection.159 The British Design Registrations Act (1839) also served as 
Ruggles’s source for the requirement of registration,160 the duration (one to three 
years, depending on the subject matter),161 the mandated range of damages,162 and 
the exclusive right to use the design during its respective term of protection.163 
However, both acts notably required the design to be “new and original”164—a 
requirement that can be traced to embryonic British design protection from 1787.165 
Thus, the earliest American design protection proposal was a direct descendant 
of British copyright and design registration law.166 The one variation—and it is a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. See Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841) (providing the relevant 
language of the Ruggles bill). 
 160. Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, §§ 1, 8 (Eng.). The British had settled 
on a dual-component system because the British textile industry vehemently objected to a 
requirement for registration, claiming (among other things) that manufacturers were already 
printing identifying information on their textile products, rendering registration (and its 
associated costs) unnecessary. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 62, at 67–69. Accordingly, 
the Copyright of Designs Act, applicable to textiles, called for no registration, in contrast to 
the Designs Registration Act. Apparently, American textile manufacturers made no similar 
plea to Ruggles. 
 161. Both the British legislation and Ruggles’s proposal protected castings, models, 
chasings, and engravings made of metal or mixed metals for three years and all other designs 
for only one year. Compare Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.), with 
Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841). 
 162. Compare Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 17, § 3 (Eng.) (guaranteeing 
£5.00 to £30.00 per offense), with Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 3 (1841) 
(guaranteeing $20 to $200 per offense and potentially including costs of suit). 
 163. Compare Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841) (granting “the sole and 
exclusive copy-right to use” (emphasis added)), with Designs Registration Act, 1839, 2 
Vict., c. 17, § 1 (Eng.) (granting the “sole Right to use”). However, both Ruggles’s bill and 
the British Designs Registration Act arguably granted broader protection than the 
corresponding British Calico Act for fabrics. See Calico Act, 1839, 2 Vict., c. 13, § 1 (Eng.) 
(limiting protection to the “sole Right and Liberty of printing and re-printing”). 
 164. Unfortunately, their common origins shed little light on Ruggles’s bill. Although the 
terms “new and original” can be found in numerous British copyright acts, similar to their 
U.S. development, they were often loosely interpreted synonymously. See LEWIS EDMUNDS, 
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN DESIGNS 24 (1895) (noting that “[w]hether any distinction was 
intended to be made between these terms does not seem clear”); MICHAEL FYSH, RUSSELL-
CLARKE ON COPYRIGHT IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 36 (5th ed. 1974) (noting that even as of the 
1970s, “[a]s to what distinction, if any, is to be drawn between the words new and original is 
doubtful”). Yet contrary to the United States, as these terms began to take on distinct 
meanings, contemporary British design acts were amended in a manner that reflected their 
pseudo-copyright origins—requiring the design to be new or original. Patents and Designs 
Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 29, § 49 (Eng.) [hereinafter Patent and Designs Act]; see also 
EDMUNDS, supra, at 24 (pointing out that these terms should be construed without analogy to 
patents). 
 165. Calico Printers’ Act, 1787, 27 Geo. 3, c. 38, § 1 (Eng.) (granting protection to 
“every person who shall invent, design, and print, or cause to be invented, designed, and 
printed, and become the proprietor of any new and original pattern or patterns for printing 
linens, cottons, callicoes [sic], or muslins” (emphasis added)). See generally HENRY L. 
ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74 (1842) 
[hereinafter Ellsworth Report for 1841]. 
 166. Ruggles may have been familiar with British copyright law as a result of his 
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crucial one—is that Ruggles’s bill not only contemplated registration but also 
required that applications for protection be subjected to pre-grant examination, 
reminiscent of the procedures in place for American utility patents.167 
The inclusion of an examination requirement was pure Ruggles. In his capacity 
as chair of the Senate’s Select Committee on the affairs of the Patent Office,168 
Ruggles had championed the idea of establishing a system of pre-grant, substantive 
patent examination in the utility patent system. Under his guidance, the committee 
had produced the 1836 Patent Act,169 still the most significant legislative reform in 
the history of the American patent system largely due to its implementation of pre-
grant examination. It is no surprise that Ruggles, perhaps reflexively, would have 
included an examination requirement in his design protection proposal. 
Moreover, in the 1836 Patent Act, Ruggles also laid the administrative 
foundation for a modern patent office that would carry out that pre-grant 
examination.170 He was venerated, with considerable justification, as the “Father of 
the Patent Office.”171 He had worked closely on the 1836 Patent Act with Henry 
Ellsworth, the superintendent of the Patent Office who became the first 
Commissioner of Patents under the new administrative structure that the 1836 act 
provided,172 and Charles Keller, the model room keeper who became the first 
examiner under the new act.173 Indeed, Ruggles had been, and remained, intimately 
                                                                                                                 
involvement in a debate over whether to extend U.S. copyright protection to British authors. 
See S. 32, 25th Cong. (1838) (extending U.S. copyright protection to residents of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and France upon print and publication in the U.S. simultaneously with its 
foreign issue, or within one month of its requisite deposit in any U.S. district court); S. REP. 
NO. 25-494, at 3–4 (1838) (report to accompany S. 32, recording Ruggles’s views). In any 
event, few in Washington at the time could have claimed greater expertise with American 
intellectual property laws than Ruggles. 
 167. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. §§ 1, 4 (1841). 
 168. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1835). He was joined on the committee by 
Samuel Prentiss (Vermont) and Isaac Hill (New Hampshire). Id. The select committee was 
an ad hoc patent law reform committee formed at Ruggles’s request. Ruggles had applied for 
a patent under the then-existing 1793 act and had become sufficiently frustrated over the 
act’s delays and other deficiencies that he made a speech on the Senate floor calling for 
reform. The Father of the Patent Office, SCI. AM., May 9, 1891, at 295–96 (describing the 
speech based on Ruggles’s notes). 
 169. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 170. See generally JOHN RUGGLES, REPORT WITH SENATE BILL NO. 239, S. REP. NO. 24-
338 (1836) [hereinafter 1836 Patent Act Report]. Indeed, Ruggles similarly played a unique 
role laying the Patent Office’s physical foundation after its destruction. See JOHN RUGGLES, 
REPORT WITH SENATE BILL NO. 107, S. REP. NO. 24-58 (1837). 
 171. The Father of the Patent Office, supra note 168, at 295. 
 172. We imagine that it is no coincidence that the first utility patent under the 1836 act 
regime was issued to Ruggles. Locomotive Steam-Engine for Rail and Other Roads, U.S. 
Patent No. 1 (issued July 13, 1836). 
 173. Charles Keller was appointed to the first examiner’s role under the new act at the 
request of both Ellsworth and Ruggles and also served as the Patent Office’s model room 
keeper. See Thaddeus Hyatt, Charles M. Keller and the American Patent Office, SCI. AM., 
May 21, 1859, at 310. While many commentators credit Ruggles and Ellsworth as the 
originators of the 1836 Patent Act, the two likely received a considerable amount of input 
from Keller. Id. Keller inherited the position from his father and had been advising patent 
applicants informally since Superintendent Pickett’s administration. Id. Not only was 
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involved with the Patent Office.174 When he left the Senate shortly after presenting 
Mott’s petition and the proposed legislation, Ruggles was angling for an 
appointment as the next Commissioner of Patents.175 The requirement for 
examination, which surely could best be carried out at the Patent Office, reflected 
Ruggles’s past alliances and served his future aspirations. 
Ruggles’s proposed bill passed the Committee on Patents without 
amendment.176 The committee’s chairman and Ruggles’s longtime colleague,177 
Senator Samuel Prentiss, reported it on March 3, 1841. Unfortunately for Ruggles, 
this was the last day of the congressional session. Likely a victim of its timing, the 
bill was tabled and ordered to be printed.178 More importantly, because Ruggles had 
failed to win his reelection campaign two years earlier, this was also his last session 
in the Senate.179 
                                                                                                                 
Ellsworth’s letter to the Secretary of State (John Forsyth) full of recommendations from 
Keller, but Ruggles also worked directly with Keller while drafting the bill. See id.; 
KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY 99 (1997); Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” 
Versus “Scientific Men” in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24, 27 
(1976); see also Letter from Henry Ellsworth, Superintendent of the Patent Office, to John 
Forsyth, Sec’y of State (Jan. 29, 1836) reprinted in 8 MECHANIC’S MAG. no. 4, Oct. 1836 at 
175–82 (response to Senator Ruggles’s questions from the select committee). Regardless of 
Keller or Ellsworth’s impact on the act, Senator Ruggles is universally recognized as its 
tireless political sponsor. 
 174. Ruggles was even credited with being the first person on the scene attempting to 
save the Patent Office building when it caught fire in 1836. JOHN RUGGLES, REPORT WITH 
SENATE BILL NO. 107, S. REP. NO. 24-58 (1837) (providing a very detailed account of the 
destruction at the Patent Office); DOBYNS, supra note 173, at 107. If anything, Ruggles’s 
involvement with the Patent Office may have been a bit too intimate. See HUGH L. WHITE, 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, S. REP. NO. 25-377 (1838) (investigating whether 
Ruggles used undue influence to procure a reissued patent, explaining that Ruggles 
frequented the Patent Office and had close connections with Charles Keller, and hinting that 
he may have occasionally accessed the office’s secret archives where caveats were held). 
 175. Letter from John Ruggles, U.S. Senator, to Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State 
(Apr. 24, 1841) (on file with Robert D. Farber University Archives & Special Collections 
Department, Brandeis University) (containing Ruggles’s rather lavish recitation of his 
qualifications for the position, including, among other things, that “[i]n reconstructing a code 
of [American] patent law, I introduced new principles of acknowledged usefulness & 
importance; which have since been adopted in England”). We are indebted to Sarah 
Shoemaker, special collections librarian at Brandeis University, and Maribel Nash, reference 
librarian at the Pritzker Legal Research Center at Northwestern School of Law, for helping 
us unearth the letter. Ruggles procured several letters of recommendation and no doubt was 
surprised when the position went to Henry Ellsworth instead. Id. (containing the letters of 
recommendation). 
 176. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1841). 
 177. Senator John Ruggles and Senator Samuel Prentiss served together intermittently 
since the first select committee was formed in 1835 to reform the existing patent registration 
system. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1837); CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 
1st Sess. 64 (1835). 
 178. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1841) (noting that Ruggles’s bill “was laid 
on the table and ordered to be printed”). 
 179. Ruggles’s departure from the Jacksonian Democrats likely played a key role in his 
failed reelection bid. See Maine Senator, THE PITTSFIELD SUN, Feb. 4, 1841, at 3 (citing 
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B. 1842 Ellsworth Report and Proposed Legislation: The Emergence of 
Quasi-Patent Concepts 
Mott’s lobbying efforts, however, continued into 1842. His petition was 
presented again in the Senate in March 1842,180 and Ruggles’s former colleague 
Senator Prentiss introduced legislation in April 1842.181 The 1842 legislation, 
however, still bore indications of Ruggles’s original conception of a design 
copyright regime with substantive pre-grant examination. Yet, it also had become 
infused with more patent law rhetoric, undoubtedly as a result of suggestions made 
by the man who had been granted the appointment that Ruggles so assiduously 
sought—Patent Commissioner Henry Ellsworth. 
In his annual Commissioner’s Report to Congress for the year 1841,182 
published and referred to the Senate Committee on Patent and the Patent Office on 
March 8, 1842,183 Ellsworth included three paragraphs recommending the 
protection “of new and original designs for articles of manufacture, both in the fine 
and useful arts.”184 After pointing out that other nations had granted such 
protection,185 Ellsworth reiterated the rationale for protection that had been offered 
in Mott’s petition: 
                                                                                                                 
BOSTON POST). While Ruggles was elected to the senate as a Jacksonian Democrat, he split 
ways with his party on several key issues. See LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, MAINE: A HISTORY 
(1919) 218 (noting that “[h]e served but one term as Senator, broke from his party on the 
sub-treasury question, and was retired from political life”); David J. Russo, The Major 
Political Issues of the Jacksonian Period and the Development of Party Loyalty in Congress, 
1830-1840, 62 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y, no. 5, at 3, 18, 41, 46 (1972) (describing 
Ruggles as a renegade Democrat and noting his departure from the party on the issues of 
slavery and the sub-treasury). By 1840, both Whigs and Conservatives were claiming 
Ruggles as a loyalist. See A POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1840 4 (1840) (Whig); United States 
Senator, CHRISTIAN SECRETARY, Aug. 21, 1840, at 2 (Conservative); Harrison or Whigs, 
NEW WORLD, Jan. 23, 1841, at 61 (Harrison or Whigs); Senator Ruggles, JEFFERSONIAN 
REPUBLICAN, May 16, 1840, at 2 (noting that Ruggles “now goes for [Whig President] 
Harrison and reform”). In the end, however, it appears that he ultimately sided with the 
Conservatives and might have earned the moniker “Benedict Arnold” in return. Maine 
Senator, supra, at 3 (stating, “Ruggles must know that the English never respected or trusted 
Arnold much, after his treason, and now, in their retirement, they may have leisure to make 
some reflections upon that fact”). 
 180. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (1842) (petition presented in March 1842 
by Senator Daniel Sturgeon (Pennsylvania) from the Committee on Patents). 
 181. S. 220, 27th Cong. (1842). 
 182. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74 (1842). Hudson claims that the 
report is dated February 8, 1841, Hudson, supra note 58, at 380, but this appears to be an 
error—Ellsworth’s annual report covered Patent Office operations in 1841 and therefore 
would not have been circulated until sometime in 1842. See Ellsworth Report for 1841, S. 
REP. NO. 27-169, at 1 (dated January 1842 by Ellsworth, referred for printing on February 7, 
1842, and later referred to the Patent Committee on March 8, 1842). 
 183. See Ellsworth Report for 1841, S. REP. NO. 27-169, at 1. 
 184. Id. at 2. 
 185. Id. (asserting that “[o]ther nations have granted this privilege, and it has afforded 
mutual satisfaction alike to the public and to individual applicants”). 
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Competition among manufacturers for the latest patterns prompts to the 
highest effort to secure improvements, and calls out the inventive 
genius of our citizens. Such patterns are immediately pirated, at home 
and abroad. A patent [sic, pattern] introduced at Lowell,186 for instance, 
with however great labor or cost, may be taken to England in 12 or 14 
days, and copied and returned in 20 days more.187 
To address this situation, Ellsworth asserted, legal protection should be extended to 
“new and original designs for a manufacture of metal or other material, or any new 
and useful design for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other fabric,”188 an 
adaptation of Ruggles’s and Mott’s language and a nod to the lobbying influence of 
the iron and textile industries. Ellsworth also suggested that protection be available 
for “a bust, statue, or bas-relief, or composition in alto or basso-relievo.”189 But this 
was not language from Ruggles’s proposal, it was copyright language—
specifically, language from British copyright law.190 
However, the copyright language notwithstanding, Patent Commissioner 
Ellsworth made clear that he was not styling his proposal as a copyright proposal. 
Instead, he posited that the proposed protection “could be effected by simply 
authorizing the Commissioner to issue patents for these objects, under the same 
limitations and on the same conditions as govern present action in other cases.”191 
The patent term could be seven years (half of the fourteen-year duration for utility 
patents),192 and the application fee correspondingly could be half that charged for 
utility patent applications.193 
From a modern vantage point, Ellsworth’s allusion to patents may seem to be a 
dramatic shift away from Ruggles’s copyright proposal. However, differences 
between the substantive rules in the respective regimes were slight at the time of 
Ellsworth’s report. Even the respective terms of patent and copyright had been 
comparable until only a few years prior.194 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. See generally RIVARD, supra note 104, at 59–65 (discussing the importance of 
Lowell, MA, to the textile industry). 
 187. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. An Act for Encouraging the Art of Making New Models and Casts of Busts, 1798, 
38 Geo. 3, c. 71, § 1 (Eng.) (protecting any “new Model, Copy, or Cast, or any such new 
Model, Copy or Cast in Alto or Basso Relievo” of human or animal figures). Analogous 
protection for three-dimensional objects in U.S. copyright law did not come into effect until 
1870. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (specifically including “any book, map, 
chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative 
thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs 
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts” (emphasis added)). 
 191. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2. 
 192. Contra Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124–25 (1836) (extending 
protection for another seven years, beyond the initial fourteen years, where the patentee 
failed to obtain reasonable remuneration through no fault of their own). 
 193. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2. 
 194. Until 1831, both initial terms were fourteen years; however, by renewal authors 
could double their copyright term. Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 
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Moreover, other evidence suggests that Ellsworth’s nonchalant reference to 
patents was motivated more by pragmatic political considerations than any 
perception that patent rules were preferable to copyright rules for protecting 
designs.195 Under Ellsworth’s proposal, fees of fifteen dollars for design protection 
would be paid into the Patent Office.196 By contrast, antebellum copyright 
protection involved a mere fifty-cent fee, payable to the federal court in the district 
where the applicant resided and collected when the author deposited a copy of the 
work with the court before publication, prepublication deposit being a prerequisite 
of copyright protection at the time.197 
Against the backdrop of a recessionary economy,198 not to mention construction 
costs for a newly completed Patent Office building that ran four times higher than 
its appropriation,199 a new revenue stream for the Patent Office would have been 
especially attractive. The Congressional Globe’s notation regarding floor 
commentary on the proposed legislation highlights the bill’s revenue effects, 
reporting that the bill’s sponsor (Kerr) “explained, at great length, that the bill was 
intended to apply the rights of patents to new objects, and thereby bring additional 
revenue into the patent department, and to protect rights of patentees.”200 Indeed, 
Senator Kerr would have been especially attuned to these revenue issues—he had 
previously chaired the Committee on Public Buildings,201 which had oversight 
responsibility for the Patent Office rebuilding project and, as current chairman of 
                                                                                                                 
124 (1790), with Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21 (1793). 
 195. Likewise, pragmatic considerations apparently motivated design protection 
proponents in Britain to avoid placing British design protection under the auspices of the 
patent system. The bureaucracy of the British patent system was notoriously byzantine, and 
it was considered undesirable to subject design protection to those idiosyncrasies. SHERMAN 
& BENTLY, supra note 62, at 81–83. 
 196. Ellsworth’s proposal suggested charging “one half of the present fee charged to 
citizens and foreigners, respectively.” Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2 
(emphasis in original). Per contemporary utility patent fees (minimum $30), a granted design 
patent cost American citizens $15. See U.S. PATENT OFFICE, INFORMATION TO PERSONS HAVING 
BUSINESS TO TRANSACT AT THE PATENT OFFICE 7 (1836), reprinted in RULES OF PRACTICE: U.S. 
PATENT OFFICE (1899) (compilation held by Cornell University Library). Because of the 1836 Patent 
Act’s discriminatory pricing, it would have been much more expensive for foreigners—$500 for the 
British and $300 for everybody else. Id. 
 197. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437. 
 198. See supra Part II. 
 199. SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN REFERENCE BOOK 247 (Albert A. Hopkins & A. Russell Bond 
eds., 1905) (noting that Congress had appropriated about $100,000 for the construction in 
1836 and that the building, completed in 1840, had cost over $400,000); see also S. 296, 
24th Cong. (1836) (pertinent legislation proposed by John Ruggles). 
 200. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., at 833 (1842) (remarks of Senator Kerr). See 
infra note 226 (explaining Kerr’s involvement). Of course, Ellsworth might have been able 
to achieve these revenue goals irrespective of the form of protection he proposed by 
providing that fees would be paid to the Patent Office even if the protection were more akin 
to copyright. For example, Ruggles’s proposal would have given the Patent Office authority 
over the proposed design copyright system, and applicants would have paid $10 in 
application fees. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 6 (1841). 
 201. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1842). 
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the Patent Committee,202 he had just two days prior to this commentary reported a 
bill proposing to expand the new Patent Office building.203 
In addition, it is no surprise that Ellsworth, as Commissioner of Patents, would 
make a proposal to expand his own department’s jurisdiction nor that he would do 
so in the context of his annual report.204 And Ellsworth would have reasonably 
expected enormous deference from Congress.205 The Senate committee on patents 
frequently solicited Ellsworth’s recommendations206 and frequently acted on them. 
The two pieces of patent legislation that passed between 1836 (when Ellsworth 
became Commissioner) and 1845 (when Ellsworth left the post) can be traced to 
recommendations he made in his annual reports.207 These reports had a wide 
audience around the country, albeit probably for the agricultural statistics included 
in the report rather than the patent policy matters.208 
One commentator, Thomas B. Hudson, has offered additional reasons 
purporting to explain why design protection was effectuated by patent rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. S. Journal, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1842). 
 203. S. 290, 27th Cong. § 1 (1842); S. Journal, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 524 (1842). 
 204. By 1839, Ellsworth had already successfully lobbied for the expansion of the 
Commissioner’s evidentiary powers and pushed the Patent Office into the business of 
collecting agricultural statistics. Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, §§ 9, 12, 5 Stat. 353, 354–55. 
Before leaving the Commissioner’s role in 1845, Ellsworth even managed to help Samuel 
Morse obtain a large appropriation for further experimentation on the telegraph. HARRY 
KURSH, INSIDE THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE 26 (1959). 
 205. Ellsworth came from a family of great prominence in early American society. His 
father had been a Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and his twin brother was a 
formidable judge and politician. See William I. Wyman, Henry L. Ellsworth, The First 
Commissioner of Patents, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 524, 524 (1919). But Ellsworth did not 
simply rest on his family’s reputation. By the time that President Jackson made him 
Commissioner at the age of forty-five, he had already been a mayor in Connecticut 
(Hartford), run a large insurance company (Aetna), and even helped Jackson as one of his 
chief commissioners of Indian Affairs (overseeing the vast displacement of Native 
Americans in what many historians refer to as the “Trail of Tears”). See KURSH, supra note 
204, at 26. 
 206. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Ellsworth, U.S. Comm’r of Patents, to John Ruggles, 
U.S. Senator (Feb. 23, 1838), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 25-797, at 3–5 (1838) (responding 
to Ruggles’s inquiry into whether further legislation was necessary for business at the Patent 
Office). 
 207. The design patent legislation was part of a larger 1842 Patent Act, and in that bill, 
five of the six sections were proposed in Ellsworth’s report. Compare HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74, at 2 (1842), with Act of 
Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, §§ 1, 3–6, 5 Stat. 543, 543–45. Likewise, eleven of the thirteen sections of 
the 1839 act derive from one of Ellsworth’s annual reports. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, 
5 Stat. 353, with HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 25-80, at 2–4 (1839), and HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, 
S. DOC. NO. 25-105, at 2–6 (1838). 
 208. RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
47 (2010) (arguing that the agricultural statistics ultimately drove the popularity of 
Ellsworth’s annual reports); The Commissioner of Patents, OHIO CULTIVATOR, May 1, 1845, 
at 9 (lauding the importance of Ellsworth’s annual reports and noting that it “makes a 
volume of greater interest than any other volume published periodically, in this country”). 
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copyright, but these, too, strike us as unpersuasive. Hudson postulated that 
manufactured articles were closer to the subject matter of patents than the 
“intellectual products” of copyright law (e.g., books, maps, etc.).209 But this 
explanation is incomplete; Ellsworth’s proposal (and the design patent legislation 
as ultimately enacted) covered works of fine art (statues, for example), in addition 
to traditionally manufactured goods.210 Hudson also speculates that the copyright 
system lacked a central depository at the time, unlike the patent system.211 
However, design legislation could have provided for a centralized depository at the 
Patent Office even if design protection took on the form of copyright protection. 
Indeed, the Patent Office had long been used as a repository of various copyrighted 
works during its tenure,212 and this is essentially what Ruggles’s proposal had 
done.213 
In sum, the proposals that ultimately resulted in the first American design patent 
statute veered from a quasi-copyright proposal to a patent proposal for extrinsic 
reasons. Our research uncovered no evidence of any debate over the wisdom of the 
core idea that substantive utility patent law rules should govern a new design 
protection regime and no indication that drafters of the design patent statute were 
sufficiently prescient to foresee that copyright and utility patent jurisprudence 
would evolve along divergent paths in the decades to come. 
Our historical analysis also demonstrates that claims that the design patent 
system originated as an historical accident are misleading. Design protection 
legislation came about in large part because Jordan Mott persisted in his lobbying 
efforts. And Ellsworth’s adept maneuvering of the design protection scheme onto 
the Patent Office’s turf was no accident. 
On the other hand, the final chapter in the legislative odyssey of the 1842 design 
patent provisions does provide some support for the historical accident thesis. The 
design patent provisions passed during a political firestorm. The political forces 
that appear to have converged to make the design patent provisions a reality were 
transient and anomalous. We analyze these peculiar political circumstances below. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209. Hudson, supra note 58, at 383. 
 210. Ellsworth Report for 1841, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-74 (1842), at 2. 
 211. Hudson, supra note 58, at 383. 
 212. Pamphlet from William Thornton, U.S. Superintendent of the Patent Office (Mar. 5, 
1811), reprinted in AM. FARMER, Jan. 27, 1826, at 357–58 (explaining the process of 
acquiring a patent or copyright and noting that specimens of copyrighted works, like paper 
hangings and ornaments for rooms, could be deposited directly with the Patent Office or the 
Secretary of State in order to fulfill the deposit requirement). See generally R. Anthony Reese, 
Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 137 (2007) 
(describing copyright protection formalities from 1790 to 1909); John Y. Cole, Ainsworth Spofford 
and the Copyright Law of 1870, in A CENTURY OF COPYRIGHT IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 3 (1970) 
(noting that storing the copies of these works was a point of frustration for numerous patent 
commissioners, since space was such a premium at the Patent Office). 
 213. See supra Part III.A. 
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C. Passage of the 1842 Act: Design Patent Protection and the Protectionist Surge 
The Twenty-Seventh Congress received Commissioner Henry Ellsworth’s report 
recommending design patent protection in March, and in April 1842 Senator 
Samuel Prentiss, a Whig from Vermont, introduced legislation.214 It had no chance 
of progressing through the legislative process for a simple reason: the Twenty-
Seventh Congress was utterly in deadlock. 
The crisis in Congress in the spring of 1842 had its roots in a long-running feud 
between the Jacksonian Democrats and their emergent rivals, the American Whigs. 
Just over a year earlier, the Whig Party had gained a majority of seats in Congress 
and had finally captured the White House. The Whigs had won on a platform 
favoring aggressive protectionist tariffs,215 arguing successfully that the free trade 
policies of the Jacksonian Democrats had triggered the Panic of 1837, a severe 
economic recession whose effects extended into the 1840s.216 In early 1841, it 
appeared certain that the Whig legislative agenda, including the tariff legislation, 
would swiftly be enacted.217 
Then, after only a month in office, President William Henry Harrison died. His 
successor, John Tyler of Virginia, was nominally a Whig but refused to cooperate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. S. 220, 27th Cong. (1842). We do not mean to suggest that the design patent system 
was purely the product of Whig partisanship. For example, both Ruggles and Ellsworth were 
(at one point) Jacksonian Democrats. FRANKLIN BOWDITCH DEXTER, 6 BIOGRAPHICAL 
SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF YALE COLLEGE WITH ANNALS OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY 
309–12 (1912) (offering brief biographical information); supra note 179. 
 215. The Whigs had been arguing for many years that “free trade was always linked with 
depression, while protection brought prosperity.” Samuel Rezneck, The Social History of an 
American Depression 1837–1843, 40 AM. HIST. REV. 662, 670 (1935). Nevertheless, the 
Jacksonians maintained a policy of trade liberalization during their time in power, including 
much of the 1830s. Scott C. James & David A. Lake, The Second Face of Hegemony: 
Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846, 43 INT’L ORG. 1, 
9 (1989) (identifying four periods of antebellum tariff policy: increased protectionism from 
1824–33; trade liberalization from 1833–42; a “brief but decided return to protection” from 
1842–46; and the “political triumph of free trade principles” from 1846–61). 
 216. For background on the recession, see, e.g., Edward J. Balleisen, Vulture Capitalism 
in Antebellum America: The 1841 Federal Bankruptcy Act and the Exploitation of Financial 
Distress, 70 BUS. HIST. REV. 473, 479 (1996) (referring to two discrete economic downturns 
during this period, the Panic of 1837 and the Panic of 1839); PETER TEMIN, THE JACKSONIAN 
ECONOMY 148–55 (1969) (analyzing the causes of both crises). The Whigs succeeded—
albeit temporarily—in blaming the recession in part on Jacksonian banking policies, which 
were unpopular in the West, and on British trade practices, which had caused cotton prices to 
plummet and had generated resentment in the South. See Rezneck, supra note 215, at 669; 
The Protective Policy, S. LITERARY MESSENGER, Apr. 1842, at 4 (offering an Anglophobic 
polemic for high tariffs). Whatever the cause, the consequences were severe: banks failed 
and early stock markets crashed, Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie 
Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 457, 457 (2002), and the U.S. Treasury was 
nearly bankrupted. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
150 (2002). 
 217. MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY 69, 121 
(1999). 
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with Whig legislative initiatives,218 particularly the tariffs, which had long been 
unpopular in the South.219 Incensed, the Whig congressional leadership dismissed 
Tyler from the party and settled in for a monumental power struggle with the 
administration, “contemptuously” dismissing Tyler’s legislative proposals and 
bringing Washington to the verge of paralysis.220 
For a time, Tyler refused to capitulate. The Whigs passed a legislative package 
that included tariff legislation; Tyler immediately vetoed it.221 However, Tyler’s 
position was unsustainable. The tariffs were a major source of federal government 
revenue, and the tariff deadlock had the potential to shut down the government.222 
Meanwhile, sectional differences were threatening to unravel the Whigs’ fragile 
political coalition, and there were already signs that the electorate was growing 
impatient with Whig promises to pull the nation out of the recession.223 
By August 1842, the sheer enormity of the threat to the government’s fiscal 
stability convinced Tyler that he had no choice but to support a tariff program. For 
their part, the Whigs began to split up their legislative package, uncoupling the 
tariff proposal from another controversial proposal relating to the distribution of 
land revenues. While the disappearance of the land bill caused southern Whigs to 
withdraw support, the Whig tariff was sufficiently popular in depressed northern 
manufacturing areas that the Whigs were able to cobble together a flimsy coalition 
with some northern Democrats (for example, Pennsylvania Democrats whose 
constituents operated iron foundries, among others). On August 30, 1842, Congress 
passed the Whig tariff legislation, characterized by one historian as the Whigs’ sole 
legislative triumph of the session.224 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. For a concise recitation of events leading to Tyler’s rupture with Clay and the Whig 
program, see SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 523–29 (2005). 
 219. Jacksonian Democrats had traditionally resisted high tariff rates on the ground that 
the tariffs harmed southern agrarian interests. Southern resistance to proposed tariffs in the 
early 1830s had precipitated the Nullification Crisis, in which South Carolina threatened to 
secede if the tariffs were not adjusted. See Adrienne Caughfield, Tariff of 1828 (Tariff of 
Abominations), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TARIFFS AND TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY 363, 363–64 
(Cynthia Clark Northrup & Elaine C. Prange Turney eds., 2003); Robert Tinkler, Tariff of 
1832, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TARIFFS AND TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY, supra, at 365; see also 
Douglas A. Irwin, Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Regional 
Interests, 51 J.L. & ECON. 715, 730 (2008) (discussing the impact of the Tariff of 1832 on 
the South). The 1833 Compromise Tariff Act provided a tariff regime that was only slightly 
more favorable to the South. See TAUSSIG, supra note 79, at 110. For a concise discussion of 
the Nullification Crisis, see DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 395–410 
(2007). 
 220. HOLT, supra note 217, at 137, 140. 
 221. Id. at 147. 
 222. See id. at 146–47. Adding further to the urgency of the situation, tariff reductions 
promulgated several years earlier during the Jackson administration were scheduled to come 
into effect in 1842. Id. 
 223. Id. at 140. Indeed, the Whigs fared so badly in state elections in the fall of 1841 that 
by December 1841, prominent Senator John Calhoun (South Carolina) chortled that “I now 
regard the Whigs as destroyed.” Id. 
 224. See id. at 148. 
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In fact, there had been one other. The design patent legislation had lain dormant 
through the summer,225 but Mott’s petition returned to the Senate again in early 
August,226 courtesy of Prentiss’s replacement as chair of the Patent Committee, 
Whig Senator John L. Kerr from Maryland.227 Senator Kerr also moved for the 
Senate to take up the Prentiss bill for consideration.228 After two days of debate,229 
the Senate passed the bill and reported it to the House,230 where it passed without 
discussion231 the day before the passage of the tariff bill. 
Although the historical evidence is largely circumstantial, we think it likely that, 
but for the momentum of the great tariff debate, the design patent legislation would 
have been shunted aside, another casualty of the partisan stalemate. It was the tariff 
debate that brought together northern industrial interests, and these happened to be 
the very same constituencies that stood to benefit most immediately from design 
patent legislation.232 Senator Kerr, who had moved the Senate to consider Prentiss’s 
design bill on August 3, 1842,233 had also presented a petition a few months earlier 
from numerous manufacturers seeking increased iron tariffs.234 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. In addition to the obstacles that resulted from the Whigs’ fight with the Tyler 
administration, Senator Prentiss had resigned from the Senate a few days after introducing 
the design patent legislation in the spring. See CHARLES J.F. BINNEY, MEMOIRS OF JUDGE 
SAMUEL PRENTISS OF MONTPELIER, VT., AND HIS WIFE LUCRETIA (HOUGHTON) PRENTISS 12 
(1883), available at http://archive.org/details/memoirsofjudgesa00binn. 
 226. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 826 (1842) (petition presented in August 1842). 
Kerr’s reintroduction of the petition was likely done for symbolic reasons (since it had been 
five months since Sturgeon’s presentation to the same congressional session and he would 
ask Congress to take up consideration of Prentiss’s bill the following day) or because of 
changes in the Senate’s petition rules that also took place during this session. See Daniel 
Wirls, “The Only Mode of Avoiding Everlasting Debate”: The Overlooked Senate Gag Rule 
for Antislavery Petitions, 27 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 115, 128–29 (2007) (discussing the Senate’s 
evolving gag rules during this era that were intended to deal with the onslaught of 
antislavery petitions during this time). See generally Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History 
of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 156–
58 (1986) (discussing the typical Congressional reception and consideration of petitions via 
committees during this gag rule era). 
 227. After Samuel Prentiss’s abrupt retirement from the Senate, Kerr was appointed chair 
of the Senate’s Patent Committee in June 1842. S. JOURNAL, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 
(1842). 
 228. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 832–33 (1842). 
 229. Our research suggests that a provision imposing a citizenship requirement, and 
another relating to renewals for utility patents, were the only provisions debated. See infra 
note 243–44. 
 230. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 911–12 (1842). 
 231. Id. at 960. 
 232. The sentiment for protectionism dissipated almost as quickly as it arose. By 1844, 
the Democrats regained the White House, and President Polk immediately attacked the Whig 
tariff regime. See Robert P. Sutton, Tariff of 1846 (Walker’s Tariff), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
TARIFFS AND TRADE IN U.S. HISTORY, supra note 219, at 368–69; see also ROBERT W. 
MERRY, A COUNTRY OF VAST DESIGNS 205–07 (2009) (recounting Polk’s first annual 
message to Congress). 
 233. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 832–33 (1842). Prentiss had resigned from the 
Senate a few days after introducing the design legislation. Senator Kerr had been appointed 
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The political circumstances also suggest that it would have been expedient to 
characterize the design patent legislation itself as a protectionist measure.235 There 
was some precedent for this characterization in existing elements of antebellum 
American intellectual property law.236 For example, U.S. copyright protection at the 
time extended only to authors who were U.S. citizens,237 and the 1790 Copyright 
Act expressly stated that the copying of foreign works was not forbidden.238 The 
patent system likewise had included some discriminatory provisions—citizenship 
restrictions between 1793 and 1836239 and discriminatory fees,240 working 
requirements,241 and prior art provisions afterwards.242 
                                                                                                                 
chair of the Senate’s patent committee on June 15, 1842. S. JOURNAL, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 
399 (1842). 
 234. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1842) (presenting a “memorial from 
citizens of Maryland, asking that the tariff of duties on imported iron might be restored to 
what it was in 1839, with a view to protection: [which was] referred to the Committee on 
Manufactures” on April 1, 1842). 
 235. We use the term “protectionism” here in its nineteenth century sense: advocates of 
“protectionism” sought to use domestic legal regimes, including domestic intellectual 
property laws, to insulate domestic producers from foreign competition, while “free trade” 
adherents tended to lash out at the propagation and expansion of intellectual property 
regimes. Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 941–48 (2002) 
(citing free trade principles as the main ideological influence underlying a movement in 
England in the 1860s to abolish patent protection). The modern dialectic of intellectual 
property and protectionism is just the opposite: countries that recognize and enforce 
intellectual property rights regimes at or above TRIPS-mandated minimums are frequently 
said to be acting in accord with free trade principles, while countries that derogate from 
those minimums engage in “protectionism.” See, e.g., Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the Sino-
American Intellectual Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local 
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391 (1996) (using “protectionism” to 
describe the refusal of local Chinese government authorities to enforce intellectual property 
rights); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of 
the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 
280 (1997) (noting that the GATT agreement generally disfavors “protectionism” but that 
GATT-TRIPS promotes intellectual property protection that itself may be deemed 
“protectionist,” and concluding that even the modern vocabularies of intellectual property 
and international trade “sit in uneasy contrast”). 
 236. There were also arguably some British precursors. For a suggestion that 
protectionist trade policy and intellectual property rights were intertwined in an earlier era in 
English law, see Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of 
Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313 (2005). 
 237. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (limiting copyright protection to 
U.S. citizens and residents); id. § 6 (limiting copyright infringement actions to those brought 
by U.S. citizens or residents). Congress eliminated the citizenship restriction in 1891, but 
imposed requirements for publication and manufacture in the United States. See Act of Mar. 
3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 238. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. at 125 (specifying that “nothing in this act 
shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing 
within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by 
any person not a citizen of the United States”). See generally B. ZORINA KHAN, THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION 261 (2005) (discussing the provision). 
 239. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21; cf. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 
§ 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 [hereinafter Patent Act of 1836] (“any person or persons”). 
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If design protection legislation was to be sold as a protectionist measure, what 
mattered was whether the legislation privileged American firms over foreign 
firms—and it did. Consistent with protectionist ambitions, the Senate amended the 
pending 1842 design patent legislation in order to limit design patent protection to 
citizens or aliens who resided in the United States and intended to become 
citizens.243 In fact, the only amendment recorded in the Congressional Globe that 
we can tie directly to the design patent provisions involved the suggestion to 
restrict design patent protection to citizens.244 
Viewed in its proper political context, Congress’s decision to enact design 
patent legislation can be understood as an exercise implementing the Whig 
protectionist agenda, not a mere accident or a mere passive congressional response 
to Commissioner Ellsworth’s proposal to incorporate utility patent rules. The 
citizenship provision was likely far more important to the ultimate passage of the 
legislation than the suggestion to incorporate patent law rules.245 
                                                                                                                 
 240. See Patent Act of 1836, § 9, 5 Stat. at 121 (imposing a $30 application fee for U.S. 
citizens, a $300 fee for most foreigners, and a $500 fee for British applicants). 
 241. Id. § 15 (allowing a defense against infringement in cases where the patentee was a 
foreigner and had “failed and neglected for the space of eighteen months from the date of the 
patent, to put and continue on sale to the public, on reasonable terms, the invention or 
discovery for which the patent issued”). 
 242. Compare id. § 7, with Patent Act of 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. at 318–21, and Act of Apr. 10, 
1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10. See generally Margo A. Bagley, Patently 
Unconstitutional: The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 679, 684, 696–700, (tracing the limitation’s legislative history). 
 243. Predecessor proposals lacked a citizenship restriction. Compare S. 220, 27th Cong. 
§ 3 (1842) (“person or persons”), with Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 
(“citizen or citizens, or alien or aliens, having resided one year in the United States and taken the oath 
of his or their intention to become a citizen or citizens”). 
 244. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 840 (1842) (recording that Senator Wright—
presumably Silas J. Wright, a Van Buren Democrat from New York—suggested the 
citizenship restriction, and that Senator Huntington—apparently Jabez W. Huntington, a 
Whig from Connecticut—commented on the suggested amendment). The legislative package 
also included some utility patent provisions, and the relatively brief debate as recorded in the 
Congressional Globe appears to contain some erroneous references to bill section numbers, 
so it requires some careful reconstruction to determine whether certain aspects of the debate 
related to the design patent proposal. See id. (referring to citizenship amendments in “2d 
section,” which should read “3d section”). 
 245. Indeed, in 1870, when Congress lifted the citizenship restriction, Scientific American 
characterized the amendment as a great victory for the “advocates of the free trade system.” 
The New Patent Laws—Important Changes Affecting American and Foreign 
Manufacturers—Free Trade in Patents Now Fully Established, 23 SCI. AM. 87, 87 (1870) 
(referring to Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16. Stat. 198, 209–10). During the 
subsequent (Forty-Second) Congress, the Senate even passed a bill that would have again 
restricted design patents to citizens. S. 583, 42d Cong. (1872) (reincorporating the 
citizenship restriction for design patents only). Describing the amendment, Senator Morrill 
(Vermont) bluntly stated, “The effect of this change is to allow Americans to copy any 
designs that are brought here from abroad, if they choose.” CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1036 (1872). The Senator also repeatedly referred to the design patent regime as 
copyright and even a design registration system while championing the bill. See, e.g., id. at 
817, 1036; see also id. at 1427 (recording Mr. Cox’s attempt to refer the bill to the House’s 
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IV. RETHINKING THE USE OF MODERN UTILITY PATENT RULES FOR DESIGN 
PATENTS  
The American design patent system has had abundant time to establish itself 
since the era of Mott, Ellsworth, and Ruggles, but, as we have noted, it has never 
developed a clear identity. The cast-iron stove industry used the system heavily at 
the outset.246 However, industry leaders quickly grew disenchanted with design 
patent protection and pressed for alternative forms of protection, ultimately without 
success.247 
We do not prescribe the abolition of design patent protection, but we do 
advocate close scrutiny of its core assumption about the feasibility of incorporating 
utility patent rules. The starting point, then, should be the language in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 171: the mandate that the “provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions 
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.”248 It is the modern 
statutory language responding to Ellsworth’s rather cavalier pronouncement that 
the design patent system could be implemented “by simply authorizing the 
Commissioner to issue patents for these objects, under the same limitations and on 
the same conditions as govern present action in other cases.”249 This ostensibly 
lucid and often misunderstood provision has undergone very little change since its 
formulation in 1842.250 As we discuss below, a comprehensive reevaluation of 
design patents’ patent character might start with a reconsideration of design patent 
claiming practices and the concept of patentability of designs over the prior art. By 
retaining the incorporation clause as utility patent law diverged from copyright law, 
Congress has forced blind obedience to a principle that even Ellsworth might not 
have supported. 
                                                                                                                 
Committee on the Library—which handled copyright reform—and Congressman Myers’s 
rejoinder that the bill did not refer to copyright and should be referred to the House’s 
Committee on Patents). Although the House might have similarly supported the bill, the 
citizenship restriction was thrown into a much larger bill with several amendments that did 
not emerge from the House’s Committee on Patents in time for regular order before the end 
of the session. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4329–30 (1872); To amend an act 
entitled, “An act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes relating to patents and 
copyrights,” approved July eighth, eighteen hundred and seventy, H.R. 2857, 42d Cong. 
(1872) (line 105–07). 
 246. Indeed, the first reported design patent litigation involved stoves. Root v. Ball, 20 F. 
Cas. 1157 (D. Ohio 1846) (No. 12,035); see also Howell J. Harris, “The Stove Trade Needs 
Change Continually”: Designing the First Mass-Market Consumer Durable, c. 1830-1900 
(working manuscript on file with authors). 
 247. We examine this debate in forthcoming work. 
 248. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). This section is commonly referred to as an incorporation 
clause or more colloquially as a catchall. 
 249. See Du Mont, supra note 16, at 541 (citing HENRY L. ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM 
THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 74, at 2 (1842)). 
 250. Du Mont, supra note 16, at 541–43, 547–48, 564, 578–82, 587–88, 591, 596 
(discussing this section’s legislative history from the 1842 act through its modern 
embodiment and how it was used as the principal vehicle for justifying the application of the 
contemporary invention requirement and other utility patent standards). 
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A. Design Patent Claiming Practices 
The patent claim shapes much of modern utility patent analysis.251 Claim 
interpretation is the threshold step in all patentability and infringement analyses and 
has generated perhaps the most vibrant debates in contemporary patent law.252 A 
synthesis of the canons of patent claim construction literally fills multiple 
volumes.253 By virtue of the Section 171 incorporation clause, and cultural cross-
fertilization between utility patent and design patent practices, each design patent 
includes a claim.254 Accordingly, a mechanism exists for the deep inculcation of the 
utility patent claiming jurisprudence into design patent law. 
Nonetheless, while design patent law is superficially indebted to utility patent 
law’s claiming conventions, its commitment has been ad hoc. The concept of 
peripheral claiming has never quite penetrated design patent law. Design patent 
claims conventionally refer to the disclosure255 (using language such as “as shown 
and described”256); that is, they resemble central claims as opposed to the 
peripheral claims of the present-day utility patent.257 Since utility patent law has 
moved to peripheral claiming and design patent law seemingly has not, this raises a 
fundamental question about whether claim interpretation and infringement rules 
typically associated with peripheral claiming systems should carry over to the 
design patent regime. 
Unfortunately, no coherent approach to this question has emerged from the case 
law. In Gorham, the Supreme Court adopted an infringement rule that is consistent 
with the notion of central claiming, in that it permitted infringement to be found 
when the claimed and accused designs were “substantially the same” as viewed 
from the perspective of the ordinary observer.258 Over a period of decades, courts, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. See William Redin Woodworth, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 
MICH. L. REV. 755, 764 (1948). 
 252. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 253. See, e.g., ANTHONY W. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS (2d. ed. 1971); see also RIDSDALE 
ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS (1949); ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM 
DRAFTING (6th ed. 2010). 
 254. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2010). 
 255. Although design patents formerly included more detailed claims that resembled 
utility patents, advances in photography and the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobson v. 
Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (emphasizing that a design patent’s scope is best represented 
by its drawings), cemented a shift in design patent claiming towards the simple reference to 
the drawings that we see today. 
 256. 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (requiring the claim to be “in formal terms to the ornamental 
design for the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown and described”). For a 
modern example, the design patent covering Apple’s iPad includes the following claim: 
“The ornamental design for a portable display device, as shown and described.” Portable 
Display Device, U.S. Patent No. D-627,777, at [57] (filed Jan. 6, 2010). 
 257. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1776 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming 
Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 796 (2009). 
 258. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511, 528 (1871). There was no controversy 
over the substantial similarity formulation; the main issue was whether the ordinary observer 
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including the Federal Circuit, added a separate inquiry to the Gorham analysis,259 
requiring a showing that the accused design appropriated the “points of novelty” of 
the claimed design260—arguably bringing the design patent infringement analysis 
closer to the strict element-by-element analysis associated with literal infringement 
in peripheral claiming systems.261 The Federal Circuit also held that the doctrine of 
equivalents—whose value is most evident in a peripheral claiming system—does 
apply to design patents,262 although harmonizing it with the point of novelty test 
                                                                                                                 
ordinary designer should be the putative viewer of the respective designs. Id. at 527. 
 259. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. SWISA, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 671 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(noting that the court had switched from treating the point of novelty inquiry conjunctively 
with Gorham, to treating it as a separate test). In support of the Federal Circuit’s 
“conjunctive” approach, the Egyptian Goddess court cited L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn 
Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1993), and Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 
745 F.2d 621, 628 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Id. For examples of its application as a separate 
test, the court cited Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 437 F.3d 1383, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006), Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2002), Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995), 
and Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int’l, 157 F.3d 1311, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
Id. 
 260. The point of novelty test required courts to identify the elements of the patented 
design that distinguished it from the prior art. See Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, 
LLC, No. CIV.A.02-4595, 2005 WL 354103, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2005) (identifying 
eight points of novelty from the prior art), aff’d, 437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Infringement could only be found where the accused article included the protected design’s 
point of novelty (or many points of novelty, as in Lawman). See Litton Sys., Inc. v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It operated as a separate inquiry 
from Gorham’s substantial similarity test for infringement. See Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. In 
tandem, these tests created an odd scenario where courts, on the one hand, viewed 
infringement as a generalist or ordinary observer when judging overall or substantial 
similarity, and on the other hand, then focused like an expert on its elements during a point 
of novelty analysis. See Winner Int’l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375, 376 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (asserting that “[t]o consider the overall appearance of a design without regard to prior 
art would eviscerate the purpose of the ‘point of novelty’ approach, which is to focus on 
those aspects of a design which render the design different from prior art designs”). For 
background on the Federal Circuit’s pre-Egyptian Goddess approach to the point of novelty 
test, see Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for Design Patent 
Infringement—On a Crash Course with the Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v. White, 
8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354 (2009); Perry J. Saidman, What Is the Point of the 
Point of Novelty Test for Design Patent Infringement?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 401 (2008). 
 261. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29–30 (1997). 
But see Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (holding that the district court did not err by factoring out the protected design’s 
elements that it deemed functional, but that it committed a procedural error by discounting 
the design’s functional elements in a manner that “convert[ed] the overall infringement test 
[(i.e., Gorham)] to an element-by-element comparison”). 
 262. Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., 93 Fed. App’x 214, 217 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (noting that Gorham’s “substantial similarity test by its nature subsumes a doctrine of 
equivalents analysis” (citing Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (recognizing that “it has long been recognized that the principles of equivalency are 
applicable under Gorham,” but noting the inapplicability of Graver Tank’s function-way-
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presented certain additional challenges.263 However, more recently, the Federal 
Circuit ruled en banc in Egyptian Goddess that the Gorham analysis should govern 
design patent infringement, shorn of any point of novelty prong or as a separate 
test.264 The court has not returned to the question of whether design patentees are 
entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents. 
This vacillation between peripheral and central claiming orientations has not 
been confined to the law of infringement. In the wake of its Egyptian Goddess 
decision, the Federal Circuit revised its test for design patent anticipation, 
eliminating the point of novelty prong that it had added only a few years 
previously.265 On the other hand, notwithstanding its newfound distaste for points 
of novelty, the Federal Circuit also quixotically reaffirmed266 that it is proper to 
dissect a claimed design into its individual features—by vainly parsing the design’s 
functional and ornamental elements—and to analyze them serially before applying 
Gorham’s test for infringement to the remaining ornamental elements,267 a decision 
that perhaps is influenced by an orientation towards patent claiming and the 
tendency to conceive of claims as combinations of elements.268 
The design patent system’s awkward embrace of utility patent claiming concepts 
has also been evident in the Federal Circuit’s approach to design patent claim 
construction. After a period during which the Federal Circuit routinely invoked 
                                                                                                                 
result test to design patents))). 
 263. See, e.g., Sun Hill Indus., 48 F.3d at 1199 (refusing to apply the doctrine of 
equivalence where the point of novelty test had not been met). 
 264. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (abandoning the point of novelty test as an 
element of the infringement analysis). 
 265. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1240 (Fed. Cir 
2009) (concluding, in light of Egyptian Goddess, that the ordinary observer test was the sole 
test for anticipation); id. at 1239 (citing Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) 
(invoking the axiom, “‘[t]hat which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier’”)). 
 266. For pre-Egyptian Goddess Federal Circuit cases affirming Richardson’s approach, 
see, for example, OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 825–26 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Lee, 838 F.2d at 
1188. 
 267. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting 
that if the district court had not parsed out the design’s ornamental aspects during claim 
construction that it would have erroneously given the patentee’s “Stepclaw” design a claim scope 
that included “the utilitarian elements of his multi-function tool,” but then attempting to reconcile 
this approach with Amini’s caution that “the deception that arises is a result of the similarities in the 
overall design [(i.e., infringement)], not of similarities in ornamental features in isolation” (citing 
Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). While 
the elimination of the point of novelty test removed a substantial hurdle for design patentees, 
functionality’s role in claim construction—as distinguished from a de jure functionality or validity 
inquiry—will likely emerge as the design patentee’s new roadblock. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for 
Apple Inc. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Richardson, 597 
F.3d 1288 (No. 08-CV-1040); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law 
Association in Support of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Richardson, 597 F.3d 1288 (No. 08-
CV-1040). 
 268. Cf. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp., 589 F.3d at 1244–45 (Clevenger, J., dissenting in 
part) (noting how the majority’s piecemeal application of the anticipation doctrine 
improperly focuses the fact finder on the design’s individual elements, as opposed to its 
mandated comparison as a whole). 
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claim interpretation as a threshold analysis in design patent cases,269 the court came 
to recognize the difficulties associated with calling for judges to translate design 
patent drawings into words as part of a claim construction exercise.270 In Egyptian 
Goddess, the Federal Circuit discouraged courts from rendering verbal claim 
constructions in design patent cases,271 a theme that it has reiterated more 
recently.272 Yet the Federal Circuit did not wish to discard the entire panoply of 
claim construction tools, so it advised courts that they might still provide 
“guidance” to the fact finder by explaining the significance of statements made 
during the prosecution of the design patent, for example,273 leaving open the 
question of which claim construction canons might likewise be retained under the 
rubric of “guidance.” 
Herculean efforts such as these to stuff design patents into a utility patent box 
look mildly ridiculous against the backdrop of the historical analysis that we have 
offered in prior sections of this paper. As we have shown, at the outset of the 
debates over U.S. design protection, there was no commitment whatsoever to a 
model of substantive patent rules, and at the close of the 1842 session, when the 
design patent legislation passed, there was virtually no indication that its passage 
represented a congressional judgment of the inherent superiority of substantive 
patent rules for designs. In any event, many of the claiming practices discussed 
above did not exist in 1842. A suggestion that the design patent system avoid the 
use of claims and associated claiming rules altogether would not have raised 
eyebrows in 1842 and perhaps should not today either. 
B. Design Patentability Standards 
Another distinguishing feature of modern utility patent jurisprudence is its 
heavy reliance on comparisons between the claimed invention and the prior art as 
the focus of the patentability analysis. This comparison is implemented through an 
elaborate rule set that defines conditions of both novelty and nonobviousness. 
These rules, as they operate today, would be virtually unrecognizable to those who 
originally pressed for design protection. 
Nothing in the historical record commands that demonstrating differences from 
the prior art be the focal point of a protectability analysis for designs. If anything, 
the stove industry narrative suggests that Mott and fellow lobbyists would have 
objected to a design patent regime had they understood that it would come to entail 
patentability requirements in the nature of nonobviousness. One of us has detailed 
in other work the circuitous path by which obviousness analysis infiltrated the 
design patent regime; we need not reiterate those arguments here.274 For the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 269. See, e.g., Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 270. See Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(noting the commission’s overemphasis on its written claim construction caused it to 
improperly focus on the designs’ elements, instead of their appearance as a whole). 
 271. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. SWISA, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679–80 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 272. Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1302–03. 
 273. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 680. 
 274. Du Mont, supra note 16. 
2013] DESIGNING THE AMERICAN DESIGN PATENT SYSTEM 879 
 
purposes of this paper, we need merely observe that the Federal Circuit has not yet 
come to grips with the incorporation of the obviousness concept into the 
assessment of designs.275 An argument that the entire exercise is conceptually 
flawed is consistent with the historical record of design patent’s nonpatent origins. 
The Federal Circuit’s commentary in International Seaway Trading Corp.276 
may provide another illustration of the need to rethink design patentability 
standards in view of the historical record. Section 171 requires not only that 
designs be new, but also that they be “original,” a requirement that has been 
included in design patent legislation since the outset277 but was rapidly swamped by 
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements. In a rare commentary on the 
originality requirement, the court speculated that the requirement “likely was 
designed to incorporate the copyright concept of originality—requiring that the 
work be original with the author.”278 Yet, as the court acknowledged, the originality 
requirement was not codified in U.S. copyright law until 1909, whereas the design 
patent legislation was enacted in 1842.279 In seeming resignation, the court 
concluded that the overriding analogy was to utility patents after all: “the courts 
have not construed the word ‘original’ as requiring that design patents be treated 
differently than utility patents.”280 Providing further credence to the Federal 
Circuit’s frustration, our historical analysis provides reason to question the wisdom 
of keeping design patent protection in the thrall of modern patentability standards 
developed under utility patent law. 
CONCLUSION 
What should come next for the design patent system? We do not argue here that 
the design patent regime should be dismantled in favor of a sui generis design 
protection regime. We do conclude that the way forward for the modern design 
patent system is to ease the design patent system back towards its mixed heritage. 
Our historical analysis persuades us that modern policy debates about the design 
patent system have exaggerated utility patent law’s grip on design patent 
jurisprudence. We conclude that Congress’s decision to enact design patent 
legislation in 1842 (1) was not an implicit rejection of other (non-patent) forms of 
design protection, such as design registration, and (2) was not an endorsement of 
using modern utility patent rules to protect designs. Arguments for shifting design 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1243–44 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (setting forth 
an obviousness standard requiring a primary reference that has “basically the same” 
appearance as the claimed design, combinable with secondary references only if they are 
closely related to the primary reference). 
 276. 589 F.3d at 1239. 
 277. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006); Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841) 
(granting protection to “new and original designs”). As discussed above, contemporary 
British design protection similarly required the design be new and original. See supra Part 
III.A. 
 278. Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1238. 
 279. Id. 
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880 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:837 
 
patent rights away from the frame of modern substantive patent law, and towards 
other frameworks such as copyright or trademark, are in no way as radical as they 
might seem on first blush. Indeed, they are arguments that would, ironically 
enough, return the design patent debate to its original roots. 
